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ABSTRACT 
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s abysmal performance during the last thirty years clearly 
demonstrates that the member-states of this alliance remain unprepared to seriously 
commit themselves to the establishment of a credible joint defense force able to facilitate 
the goal of collective security for which the GCC was established in the first place. This 
thesis seeks explanations as to why the GCC has made little progress in establishing 
mechanisms to provide collective security for its members through the lenses of 
neorealist theory and regime theory. Neorealist theory does explain the GCC’s stumble 
on the path to achieving collective security by expecting that the GCC would not succeed 
if there were other options for security, but it fails to explain the causes that led the GCC 
member-states to seek other security options. Applying regime theory in the case of the 
GCC will identify the GCC’s reasons for seeking other security options. This thesis 
hypothesizes that the GCC failed to guarantee security to its members due to its weakness 
as a regime, explained by regime theory, which led the GCC member-states to seek other 
security options provided by external power through bilateral security agreements, as 
predicted by neorealism. 
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There have been many attempts in many world regions to construct regional 
cooperation forums on political, economic, and, increasingly, security issues. The six 
Arabian Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and 
Qatar) came together to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) by means of an 
agreement formalized on May 26, 1981, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.1 While the GCC was 
established in part because the states in this region share similar social values, political 
systems, economic programs, and visions, the primary reasons for its establishment were 
their security needs and connectedness.2 These shared security concerns, particularly 
after the Iranian revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war, compelled the Gulf States to 
adopt the notion of “Collective Security” as an important goal for the GCC.3  
The notion of collective security demanded that the GCC member-states unite 
their security policies and mobilize their defense capabilities. Following a series of 
consultative meetings by the defense ministers of the GCC states, plans to develop a joint 
defense system and joint command were agreed upon and drafted. As a result of these 
plans, a Peninsula Shield Force with the size of two brigades was established in 1984 as a 
step toward a greater integration of the GCC member-states’ defense and security 
systems.4  
As of 2010, almost thirty years after the creation of the GCC, not much progress 
had been made with the initial plans to integrate the GCC member-states’ various defense 
systems. Rather, the collective defense systems of the GCC member-states remain unable 
                                                 
1 Abdul Khaleq Abdulla, “The Gulf Cooperation Council: Nature, Origin, and Process” in Middle East 
Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Michael C. Hudson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 150. 
2 Rohani Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville, VA: 
University Press of Virginia, 1988), 4. 
3 Charles Tripp, “Regional Organizations in the Arab Middle East” in Regionalism in World Politics; 
Regional Organization and International Order, ed. L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 293. 
4 Marco Pinfari, “Nothing But Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as 
Mediators in the Middle Eastern Conflicts,” Regional and Global Axes of Conflict, Crisis States Working 
Papers Series No. 2, Paper No. 45, (March 2009): 5. 
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to provide necessary and anticipated security in the event of an external threat to any of 
the GCC members.5 Some GCC member-states still rely heavily on the United States of 
America (U.S.) and the European Union for security.6 Therefore, the question that still 
looms large is why has it been so difficult for the GCC to make any meaningful progress 
in building an integrated regional defense force capable of providing much-needed 
deterrence and security, even though the region faces imminent threats and despite its 
relatively large wealth?  
This thesis uses the lenses of regime theory and neorealist theory to seek an 
explanation as to why the GCC has made so little progress in establishing the 
mechanisms that would provide collective security for its members. It also hypothesizes 
that the GCC failed to guarantee security to its members due to its weakness as a regime, 
as defined by regime theory, which led the GCC member-states to seek other security 
options provided by external power through bilateral security agreements, as predicted by 
neorealist theory. 
A. ENVIRONMENT OF THREATS FOR THE GCC 
The Middle East, particularly the Gulf Region, has been marred by a number of 
flash points for decades. In addition to past security challenges--including the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics’ (USSR) ambition to reach to the Gulf, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the 
Iran-Iraq War, and the Second Gulf War to liberate Kuwait--emergent security challenges 
such as increasing threats of terrorist attacks, and now Iran’s search for nuclear weapon 
capability, have continued to pose threats to the Gulf region.7 Efforts to reduce or 
eliminate some of these threats rely on diplomatic negotiation and collective deterrence 
through regional initiatives such as the Arab League and sub-regional regimes such as the 
                                                 
5 Tripp, “Arab Middle East,” 293. 
6 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Military Forces and Development: Challenges and 
Reforms,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2004): 1–2. 
7 Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 100–102. 
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GCC.8 However, many of these regional and sub-regional regimes have continued to 
underperform in their stated purpose of providing collective security. The search for 
answers to the question of why these regional and sub-regional regimes have 
underperformed remains incomplete. 
This thesis builds on earlier attempts to provide answers to the questions of why 
regional and sub-regional regimes such as the GCC have not been able to provide 
adequate security to their member-states; it focuses on the GCC and the contributions it 
has made to the organization of Gulf Region security. It is the intent of this thesis, 
therefore, to go beyond conventional wisdom, which argues that the GCC’s failure to 
provide security through its notion of collective security is due to the incompatibility of 
its weapons systems and apparatuses. This thesis examines the causes that prevented the 
GCC from relying on itself and strengthening its regime. 
Since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the leaders of its member-
states have sought to reach a joint mechanism that would achieve their collective security. 
Most of the literature on the GCC focuses on explaining its failures in guaranteeing 
security to its members, but the discussion has been limited to the physical and leadership 
obstacles that have prevented progress toward collective security. After the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, some imagined that the danger in the Gulf 
Region had passed. However, the reality was that the United States had broken the 
system in Iraq; this was compounded by the U.S. failure to achieve internal security in 
Iraq. The rise of sectarian tensions between Shiites and Sunnis signaled the beginning of 
new problems. Iran's influence in Iraq resulted in efforts to sway politics in favor of its 
interests by supporting the Shi’ites in taking and keeping power in Iraq; its pursuit of a 
controversial nuclear program presented the Gulf states with a new challenge. James 




                                                 
8 Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 102. 
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Faisal told an audience in Bahrain in December 2004 that a new regional security 
framework needed to be constructed,”9 one that could convince the decision-makers of 
the Gulf states to take more effective steps to meet these challenges. 
The rise of Al-Qaeda operations from within Yemen and its ability to destabilize 
the security of the Gulf States should also have convinced the GCC to move toward 
achieving collective security. Before moving forward, however, it is important to 
understand the real reasons behind the GCC’s failure to achieve this security during the 
last thirty years. It is necessary to look deeper, so as to discover the source of these 
obstacles and ways of avoiding them in the future, thus reaching the goal of GCC 
security.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been few empirical studies that provide answers to the question of 
why the GCC has not succeeded in meeting one of its key objectives, namely that of 
guaranteeing member-state security. Marco Pinfari points out, “Most of the literature 
dealing with the GCC was in fact produced within the first ten years of life of the 
organization when the interest in sub-regionalism in the Gulf region was high, partly as a 
consequence of the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 Gulf War.”10 In one of those limited 
attempts to provide answers to similar questions, Rolin Mainuddin, et al., conclude that, 
as a matter of strategy, “at its inception in May 1981, the GCC did not specifically 
identify military security as one of the areas for regional cooperation,” which set the 
precedent for a lack of future progress and even outright failures in the area of security.11 
In fact, security only became a high priority on the GCC agenda as a result of South 
Yemen’s increased threats to Oman in the beginning of 1981 and a late 1981 coup d'état 
in Bahrain.12  
                                                 
9 James Russell, “Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma,” in Middle East Policy, 
xii, no. 3 (Fall 2005):65. 
10 Pinfari, “Nothing But Failure,” 9. 
11 Rolin Mainuddin, Joseph Aicher, and Jeffrey Elliot, “From Alliance to Collective Security: 
Rethinking the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Middle East Policy 4, no. 3 (March 1996): 39–49. 
12 Ibid. 
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The assertion that the GCC’s failure to evolve into a viable security institution is 
because it was not established as such at the outset stands to be challenged. However, 
Mainuddin, et al., argue that security was actually one of the prime motivations for the 
establishment of the GCC, although it was not explicitly stated by the GCC so as to avoid 
alarming neighboring states.13 On the contrary, Laura Guazzone argues, the failure to 
include security and defense matters at the GCC’s inception was probably because “the 
legitimacy of the GCC for the Gulf people rests on its being instrumental to the 
fundamental goal of development.”14 Accordingly, there is no strong link between the 
GCC’s failures to provide security guarantees to its members and the lack of a security 
agenda at its inception.  
Pinfari goes further and posits that the process that led to the creation of the GCC 
sprang from common strategic and ideological worries, rather than a long-term project of 
unification. He adds that the conditions that brought about the Arab League at the end of 
World War II were different. The fear of 1979’s Iranian Islamic Revolution and its call 
for the spread of revolution in the region, as well as the Iraqi-Iran war in 1980s, resulted 
in the GCC’s creation.15 
Mainuddin, et al., and Muhammad Al-Musfer further argue that the subsequent 
agreements in 1991 between the GCC members on one hand, and Syria and Egypt on the 
other, to adopt new security dimensions created considerable confusion and challenges 
for the GCC regarding the appropriate security strategy. Such confusion and challenges 
stem from the “Declaration of Damascus” of March 6, 1991, which called for a security 
structure that ensured Pan-Arab expansion.16  
Al-Musfer contends that the concept of regional security was eroded first by the 
Gulf Wars and then by internationalizing the priorities of Gulf security. These priorities 
have shifted from addressing the security threats posed by Israel to those threats 
                                                 
13 Mainuddin et al., “Collective Security,” 39–49. 
14 Laura Guazzone, “Gulf Cooperation Council: The Security Policies” in Survival 30, no. 2 (1988): 
134–148. 
15 Pinfari, “Nothing But Failure?,” 4. 
16 Mainuddin et al., “Collective Security,” 39–49. 
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generated within the Gulf Region by some member-states, such as Iraq and Iran. The first 
Gulf War turned Iran into a primary threat, while the Second Gulf War saw Iraq replace 
Iran as the primary threat. The 1991 agreement between the GCC states and Syria and 
Egypt, referred to as the “Declaration of Damascus” allowed Syrian and Egyptian troops 
to remain in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait after their participation in the Second Gulf War, 
which in a way, was a new version of Pan-Arab collective security that failed before it 
was applied. Al-Musfer argues that this new regional security failed as a result of 
pressure from Iran, which viewed the agreement as a disadvantage to its security. 
Additionally, Israel opposed the agreement, especially the involvement of Syria, because 
of continual conflict between the two nations. Therefore, Egyptian and Syrian troops 
withdrew from the Gulf. A few weeks later, another declaration in Riyadh called for a 
security structure that ensured direct Western involvement and support.17 These 
additional agreements undermined the GCC’s ability to provide collective security as was 
originally intended. 
Studies by Charles Wallace, Richard Schofield, and Marco Pinfari conclude that 
although the GCC is a regional security institution that attempts to provide security to the 
Gulf States, it remains operationally ineffective, as demonstrated by its inability to deter 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent threat to Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s.18 
Some of the failures of the GCC to evolve into an effective security institution stem from 
increased U.S. security guarantees to the Gulf Region.19 Over the years, the GCC 




                                                 
17 Muhammad Al-Musfer, Al-Tahaddiat Al-Amniah Ldewal Majles Al-Ta’awon Al-Khaligi, A-
Majalah Al-Elmiah Lekuliat Al-Idarah Wa Al-Igtesad, trans. by the author, no. 9 (April 1998), 15. 
18 Charles Wallace, “Airpower and the Emerging U.S. Security Framework for the Persian Gulf,” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 15; Richard Schofield, “Boundaries, Territorial 
Disputes and the GCC States” in Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century, ed. D. E. Long and C. Koch 
(London: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997), 146; Pinfari, “Nothing But 
Failure,” 15–16. 
19 Wallace, “Security Framework,” 15. 
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defense support systems. This overreliance on external security guarantees has created a 
laxity within the GCC regarding the development of independent “functional 
coordination and cooperation.”20 
James Russell, Matteo Legrenzi, Kristian Ulrichsen, and Muhammad Al-Musfer 
conclude that disputes among the member-states and the lack of a common threat 
perception are at the top of the list of reasons why the GCC states have not organized 
themselves into an overarching security construct. Instead of consolidating the 
relationship among GCC states in order to achieve collective security, these disputes 
increased at the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Legrenzi adds that the signing by 
Bahrain and Qatar of bilateral free trade agreements with the United States in 2004 risked 
undermining a customs union that had come into existence in 2003, and increased 
tensions among the GCC states. At the same time, it showed an increasingly independent 
tendency by the smaller GCC member-states in their foreign policy-making, which could 
undermine the GCC’s role. Saudi Arabia’s objection to the building of the Bahrain-Qatar 
freeway in 2005, over claims that it would cross Saudi sovereign waters, further 
highlighted how critical the perception of sovereignty remains in the Gulf. 
The complex trade relations between some Gulf states and Iran limit these states’ 
willingness to consider Iran as a common menace. Russell, et al., argue, “There is no 
strategic consensus on who the GCC should guard against.”21 A lack of agreement and 
differences in views of threats as more or less important, accounts for the mostly 
symbolic Peninsula Shield, which was originally intended to defend the GCC states from 
Iran. Some states see Iran as the most important threat they have to deal with, while 
others see Iran as a permanent neighbor sharing with them history, religion, and trade and 
one that should be contained through diplomatic ways.  
Al-Musfer, Ulrichsen, and Legrenzi further assert that the GCC’s failure to 
achieve collective security is partially explained by the smaller member-states’ concerns 
                                                 
20 Wallace, “Security Framework,” 16. 
21 Russell, “Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma,” 65; Matteo Legrenzi, “The 
Peninsula Shield Force: End of a Symbol?” Gulf Research Center no. 3 (July 2006): 11; Kristian Ulrichsen, 
“Internal and External Security in the Arab Gulf State,” Middle East Policy (Summer 2009): 41; Al-
Musfer, “Tahaddiat,” 21: 
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regarding Saudi dominance in the region. According to Ulrichsen, “Lingering 
interregional disputes and fears of Saudi hegemony on the part of the smaller member-
states have hampered progress toward security cooperation.”22 During the 1986 meeting 
that led to establishment of the Peninsula Shield force, Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE 
insisted on a proviso that when the force enters one member’s territory the command 
structure shifts from Saudi Arabia to that of the host country. This insistence underlines 
the anxiety of smaller member-states with regard to possible Saudi interference in their 
internal affairs and the symbolic nature of joint military enterprises.23 
A study by Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid on the challenges, reforms, and 
development of the Saudi Military Forces concludes that the Saudi military, which is 
comparably the biggest in terms of force size and defense budget and acquisition, must 
reform in order to guarantee security for Saudi Arabia in the midst of various threats in 
the Gulf Region, especially those posed by countries such as Iran, which is rapidly 
pursuing nuclear weapons capability. In many ways, this conclusion indicated that Saudi 
Arabia could not rely exclusively on the GCC for its security. The study highlights the 
main reason that would compel Saudi Arabia to not rely on the GCC to guarantee 
security for its member-states; that is, the lack of “true integration of security efforts” 
among the member-states’ militaries. This lack of true integration of security efforts takes 
the form of combined inadequacy in interoperability at all levels,24 which leads to a lack 
of progress in developing effective information technology, as well as a failure to develop 
the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (IS&R) and net-centric systems that could 
tie together the GCC member-states’ forces. 
Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi add that the GCC regimes are inherently 
unwilling to build an effective military that could achieve collective security for them. 
“The most that could be said about the Peninsula shield force is that it existed but to 
                                                 
22 Ulrichsen, “Internal and External Security,” 41. 
23 Legrenzi, “Peninsula Shield Force,” 11. 
24 Cordesman and Obaid, “Saudi Military Force,” 1–2. 
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fulfill a symbolic role,”25 and as a result it has remained ineffective for more than twenty 
years. In the opinion of Gulf rulers, the risks of setting up an effective standing army 
outweigh any benefits that could be obtained. El-Hokayem and Legrenzi point out, 
“Professional standing armies have a tendency to eventually seize the power in the Arab 
Middle East.”26 Gulf rulers remain wary of the role the army can play in their societies 
after seeing military coups in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Libya over the last fifty years. 
The prospect of armies without members of royal families in key positions of 
responsibility is a very sensitive issue for the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula.27 
Legrenzi further argues that the Peninsula Shield force is a clear demonstration of 
the symbolic nature of GCC defense cooperation. The GCC’s modest achievement in the 
field of defense integration in the form of a Peninsula Shield is consequential for many 
reasons, but there are two that are especially important. First, the acquisition of a 
disparate array of military hardware and software prevents the interoperability of 
weapons systems, which is one of the necessary steps in the direction of defense 
collaboration and integration. Second, a manpower shortage prevented the GCC states 
from agreeing to the post-Gulf War Omani proposal for Peninsula Shield expansion that 
was recommended by the Omani government. Moreover, it is unlikely that the leaders of 
these rentier states will rush to recruit a well-disciplined, fully functioning modern 
army.28  
The conventional wisdom in most of the literature written on the collective 
security mechanism of the GCC has concluded that, although the Gulf states that 
constitute the GCC have special relations, common values, similar political systems, and 
shared common goals, the GCC has not been successful in guaranteeing security for its 
                                                 
25 Legrenzi, “The Peninsula Shield Force,” 11. 
26 Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, “The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian 
Nuclear Challenge,” The Henry L. Stimson Center (May 2006): 4. 
27 Matteo Legrenzi, “Did the GCC Make a Difference? Institutional Realities and (Un) intended 
Consequences,” in Beyond Regionalism?, ed. Cilja Harders and Matteo Legrenzi (England: Ashgate, 2006), 
108.   
28 Ibid., 2. 
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members because of the incompatibility of the GCC member-states’ defense systems.29 
To date, there is not enough evidence to show that there has been a detailed examination 
of the reasons for such incompatibilities. There has also been limited examination of the 
GCC in terms of the domestic politics of each of the member-states and in terms of an 
overlap between conflict resolution and the collective security mandate of the GCC; this 
has hindered efforts to reach an explanation for the GCC’s limited success in 
guaranteeing security for its members. 
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)  
The idea behind the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can be 
traced to the British government’s 1968 declaration of withdrawal from the Gulf Area. 
New Arabian Gulf states, which achieved their independence from Britian in 1971, 
sought to cooperate and create closer ties in order to establish a system of one political 
goal, aimed at uniting their defense and economic systems. As a result of intensive 
negotiations, in May 1981, the GCC was established in Riyadh after Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE forged an alliance in the form of the GCC 
Regime. The declaration of the GCC’s establishment underlined the special relationship 
between the member-states, the similarity of their political systems, their shared destiny, 
and their mutual objectives. The member-states came together to facilitate their common 
market as a regional economic power. The GCC also established a defense planning 
council to manage its efforts to achieve collective security. To that end, the GCC 
considers aggression against any one of the member-states as deemed an aggression 
against all of them; thus, cooperation in military arena is at the core of its establishment. 
The GCC was formed to collectively address security challenges from external 
threats. The threat of the Iran-Iraq War and the Iranian Revolution and its efforts to 
export Islamic revolution to Arab side of the Gulf were the incentive behind this 
cooperation in collective security. The exclusion of Iraq was due to the difference in the  
 
 
                                                 
29 Cordesman and Obaid, “Saudi Military Forces,” 1–2. 
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nature of the Iraqi regime and the previous policies of its leaders against Kuwait. Iraq 
also has a population made up of different ethnicities, in contrast to the similar ethnicity 
of the populations of the Arab Gulf States.  
In 1984, and after intense discussions, the GCC defense ministers reached an 
agreement on the creation a force made up of two brigades, named Peninsula Shield. This 
rapid intervention force has been stationed in King Khalid Military City at Hafar al Batin 
in Saudi Arabia’s Northern province. After the Liberation of Kuwait in 1991, and in 
reaction to the shock of their force’s weakness during the invasion of Kuwait, the GCC 
agreed with Syria and Egypt, in the 1991 “Declaration of Damascus,” to deploy Syrian 
and Egyptian troops in some Gulf States so as to help defend Kuwait and the other GCC 
member-states against any external aggression. This decision was abandoned due to the 
reasons explained earlier and after Kuwait signed a bilateral security agreement with the 
United States and Britain. In 2005, the GCC decided to further develop the Peninsula 
Shield by increasing its manpower to 30,000; however, it was agreed that these forces 
would remain on-call in their home countries until needed.  
The ambition of the GCC member-states to achieve a collective security 
mechanism has been hampered by a lack of agreement on the strategic decisions that 
would lead to that goal. As a result, plans to integrate their capabilities under a joint 
command and defense network have been delayed because of incompatibilities across 
their weapons systems that were acquired from different countries. Further, the Peninsula 
Shield force’s mission was not clear; for example, it was created to meet external threats, 
but in the Second Gulf War, it did not participate as a separate army. While the ambitions 
behind the GCC’s creation were substantial, its achievements have not been as expected. 
One notable success of the GCC, however, was linking the member-states via an early-
warning military communications network. 
D. NEOREALISM THEORY AND COOPERATION 
Neorealism, or structural realism, is a theory of international relations that 
modifies classical realism. Classical realism defines international politics as a struggle 
between states, and is based on the concept of human nature. In contrast, neorealism sees 
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the behavior of states as being constrained by international structures, positing that there 
is a level above the state level, which is the “structure level.” To explain this, neorealist 
theory separates the state level from the system level. They describe the relation between 
these levels as one of causes and results; at the system level, one sees the causes and at 
the state level, the results. These results are determined by the structure of the 
international system, a system characterized by anarchy. The structure is shaped by states 
employing the principle of self-help to survive; this tendency to seek survival is the 
primary factor that shapes their behavior. Neorealism views states as similar in their 
necessities, but different in their ability to achieve these necessities. Thus, states will 
develop their military capabilities in order to ensure their security.30 
The inability of states to know each other’s intentions causes mistrust, which in 
turn leads to security dilemmas. The difference between states, in terms of their structural 
distribution of capability, limits cooperation between them, because of the fear of relative 
gain, which leads them to balance power.31 This balance of power can be achieved by 
increasing the states’ own capabilities, or by forming an alliance if there is a common 
threat; this was the GCC’s situation as it watched the rise of Iraq after the Iraq-Iran War, 
and Iran after the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq. Neorealism expects conflicts to be 
ever-present and cooperation to be rare; when it does happen, it tends to only be 
temporary. They constrain the probability of cooperation between states in a situation 
where all of them confront a common rising threat. 
E. NEOREALISM AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
Collective Security is a system or a form of cooperation in which members of a 
regime agree that an attack against one of them will be treated as an attack against all of 
them, resulting in a collective military response. It is also described as system where 
states create institutions in order to prevent wars, such as the United Nations. States may 
also form an alliance and establish a regime exclusively for collective defense and as a 
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preemptive collective security mechanism in the face of a threat, telling potential 
aggressors that an attack against any one would be considered an attack against all, and 
that they will work together to deter the attacker. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) is an example of a collective security organization that was created as military 
tool only.32 However, a regime can also take the form of an institution that includes 
economic, diplomatic, and military establishments as elements of power. The GCC is an 
example of the kind of organization that includes all of these elements; however, this 
thesis focuses only on the military side of collective security.  
Neorealism argues that cooperation comes about as the result of efforts to form an 
alliance as a regime to provide collective security only if there is rising threat. Collective 
security here is defined as an effort to prevent hegemony from arising and threatening the 
security of all other states. neorealist theory would expect this sort of cooperation to end 
when the threat is eliminated. It also argues that collective security is doomed to fail 
because of the self-help nature of anarchy, and so does not expect the regime to succeed 
if there are other options for providing security.   
F. GCC AS A REGIME 
This thesis examines the GCC as a Regime by applying the regime theory in two 
related case studies, but before doing so it is important to understand what a regime is. 
Stephen Krasner defines a regime as a “set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in given 
areas of international relations.”33 Keohane and Nye define a regime as “set of governing 
arrangements that include networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize 
behavior and control its effect.”34 Haas says, “A regime encompasses a mutually 
coherent set of procedure, rules, and norms.”35 According to Krasner, principles are 
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beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards and behavior defined in 
terms of right and commitment. Rules are specific prescriptions or prohibitions of action. 
Decision-making procedures are the dominant practices for making and executing 
collective choice. Unlike alliances in the Neorealist view of cooperation, regimes are not 
temporary arrangements for temporary purposes. It is also important to distinguish 
between regimes and agreements. Although agreements are reached for a specific 
purpose and are often established for a limited time-frame, regimes should provide their 
members with forms of cooperation that facilitate this cooperation over the long term, 
while serving collective interests that also reflect the self-interest of each member-state.36 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Arabian Gulf is a part of the Middle East, which is the most instable region in 
the world. The Gulf is a uniquely important to the rest of the world due to its large oil and 
gas reserves; these reserves meet the fuel needs of most of the world. Thus, the security 
of the Gulf Region has been not just the concern of its states, but of the whole world, with 
many efforts being made to stabilize the region over time. Not only has the Gulf 
experienced many conflicts in the past, but it also continues to face the possibility of 
others in the future. Because of the region’s history of instability, the Arab Gulf states of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, and Oman formed the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) in 1981 as a means of achieving their shared goals of prosperity and 
security from potential threats. However, almost thirty years from the GCC’s creation, 
little progress has been made to create a mechanism of collective security from within the 
GCC itself. The GCC states still rely on external powers to guarantee their security, even 
though they have the resources to increase their capabilities to balance the regional 
powers. The question of why the GCC States have stumbled in their attempts to reach to 
a mechanism of collective security is the purpose of this thesis. 
This chapter reviewed literature concerning the GCC to see if this question has 
been answered or not; however, the literature examined was limited to considering the 
results of the GCC’s decisions and their implications for the GCC as a whole. Few efforts 
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have been made to investigate the decision-making process of GCC and its effect on the 
strength of the GCC as a regime. To determine what this decision-making process is, this 
chapter explained the two theories that will be used in this thesis to see if either explains 
the GCC’s inability to achieve collective security in the Gulf. It also examined the 
relationship between neorealist theory and Cooperation on one hand, and Collective 
Security on the other. It then looked to regime theory and gave the reader an overview of 
the concept as explained in the literature. This information will aid in understanding the 
analysis provided in Chapter III. 
Chapter II presents the two case studies used in this thesis. The first case 
examines the Invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and how the GCC prepared for and responded 
to such incidents, as well as what it did to prevent such threats from recurring. The 
second case study looks at Iran as a threat, especially after the United States’ 2003 
invasion of Iraq; this case also considers how the invasion of Iraq instigated a new shift in 
power in the Gulf and the threat that Iran poses to the GCC.  
Chapter III of this thesis studies the GCC as an alliance, according to neorealist 
theory, which expects such an alliance to fail to achieve collective security if there are 
other options for achieving security, and as a regime according to regime theory, which 
explains how the GCC became a weak regime that forces its member-states to seek other 
options for achieving security. Chapter IV is the conclusion chapter that provides the 
reader with a summary of what has been covered in this thesis. 
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II. CASE STUDIES 
To study the failure of the GCC states in achieving collective security, it is 
essential to examine and analyze the GCC’s response and performance in certain cases. 
This thesis considers two cases: the 1990 Invasion of Kuwait and the current threat posed 
by Iran. This chapter presents the facts of these two cases.  
The first case, that of the Invasion of Kuwait, saw Iraq invading Kuwait after 
accusing it of stealing Iraqi oil for eight years and waging “economic war” against Iraq 
through the overproduction of oil; the invasion also provided Iraq with a way to ease the 
severe financial pressure it was under, which had arisen from an inability to pay billions 
of dollars used to finance its war with Iran. This chapter considers the following factors: 
the nature of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait; how the GCC member-states dealt 
with the crisis; whether they faced the crises collectively, or individually; and, finally, 
whether the incentive behind the Saudi essential decision of inviting the American was in 
the interest of the GCC’s collective security or Saudi national security only. 
In the second case, that of the current Iranian threat to the rest of the Gulf Region, 
the GCC has serious concerns about the influence of Iranian ideology on the Shi’ite 
population in its member-states; this influence has grown since the Iranian Revolution 
and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Iran’s new leaders called 
for exporting the revolution, especially to the Gulf states, in order to delegitimize their 
rulers. Iraq was the Arab defender who stopped Iranian ambitions and balanced power in 
the Gulf. Following the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, this balance of power 
between Iraq and Iraq has shifted, so that the Iranian threat has increased in various ways. 
The threats presented by Iran have shifted from threatened interference with the GCC to 
actual interference, and from threatened hegemony to actual hegemony. This chapter 
provides an explanation of the Iranian threat, beginning with the Islamic Revolution, 
through the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq will shed light on shifts in the balance of 
power resulting from the removal of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni government and how Iran 
exploited this new situation to further its interests in the region.  
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A. INVASION OF KUWAIT 
The question of whether Iraq decided to invade Kuwait after the end of its war 
with Iran, or as the result to what Saddam Hussein called “economic warfare” waged by 
Kuwait against Iraq, remains controversial. After the end of Iraq-Iran war, it would have 
been logical for Iraq to transition from its “war face” to that of a modern state, but instead 
Iraq began building up a huge arsenal of weapons that alarming its neighbors in the 
region. These acquisitions of weapons provoked the West and Israel to launch a 
propaganda campaign against Iraq that resulted in an escalation of Iraq’s tone against 
Israel and the West. Saddam exploited these campaigns against Iraq to create a picture of 
himself as the “Savior Leader” of the Arab World against Israel and the West. At the 
same time, he provoked and then escalated a crisis with Kuwait regarding oil prices and 
quotas. 
The historical friction between Iraq and Kuwait dates back to Kuwait’s 
independence in 1961, at which time Kuwait rejected claims made by Iraqi President 
Abdul Kareem Qasim that Kuwait was part of Iraq and his calls for annexing it. On June 
25, 1963, Qasim stated, “Iraq has decided to … demand the land [of Kuwait] arbitrarily 
held by imperialism, which belongs to the province of Basra.”37 From the 1963 coup led 
by President Abdul Salam Arif until 1989, all Iraqi claims about Kuwait centered on the 
borders between the two nations and on two islands, called Bubiyan and Warbah, which 
Iraq needed in order to access the Gulf. “The delineation of the Kuwait-Iraq boundary is 
an outstanding problem which has preoccupied every Iraqi regime from the 1960s 
onwards, with no solution as yet.”38 After the end of the war between Iraq and Iran, 
Saddam dreamed of making Iraq the hegemonic power in the Gulf and the chief 
competitive power against Israel and the West in the region; however, Iraq had come out 
of the war burdened by debt and intolerable internal difficulties. In these circumstances,  
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Iraq had two choices: to reduce military expenditures in order to develop Iraq’s economy, 
or to find additional sources of income in order to build up its military power and develop 
its economy.39  
Because the first option meant reducing the size of Iraq’s military forces and 
abandoning his hegemonic ambitions, Saddam chose the second option. Development of 
economic resources would require a long period of time, especially considering that oil 
prices are subject to international market prices, so it seemed that the shortest way to 
solve Iraq’s economic difficulties and to achieve Saddam’s political ambitions of 
hegemonic power was to exploit Iraq’s huge military power. The occupation and 
annexation of Kuwait would not only eliminate the debt resulting from the war with Iran, 
but also would give Iraq access to the Gulf through Kuwait’s coasts. As Saddam himself 
explained, “the state that has the greatest influence in the region through the Gulf and its 
oil will maintain its superiority as a superpower.”40 As a way of reducing potential 
regional reactions to his military adventure, Saddam signed a non-aggression pact with 
Saudi Arabia and worked behind the scenes in the establishment of the “Arab 
Cooperation Council” in 1989.      
At the beginning of 1990, Saddam accused Kuwait of exceeding its oil production 
quota thus pushing oil prices downward. Iraq’s demands at the beginning of the crisis 
centered on Kuwait’s exceeding the oil production quota and the resulting fall in oil 
prices; however, the ambiguous and stubborn stand of Kuwait complicated the situation. 
Iraq’s demand that oil quotas be maintained was reasonable at that time because Iraq had 
just ended an eight-year war with Iran, and needed to maximize its oil revenues as much 
as possible in order to redevelop its economy, as well as building its military power to the 
level required to be regional power.41 When Saudi Arabia and Jordan tried to resolve the 
dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, they found that the gap between the two countries went 
beyond the difference in their Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
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shares and oil prices. As is so often the case, disputes between individuals and 
communities led to a reoccurrence of past differences that complicated the situation even 
more. Iraq soon demanded Kuwait (1) a settlement about border disputes, especially 
those centering on the Rumaila oil field; (2) agreement on leasing Bubiyan and Warbah 
in order to provide Iraq with access to the Gulf; and (3) a write-off of Iraq’s debts with 
Kuwait. 
1. Official Emergence of the Crisis between Kuwait and Iraq 
During the Arab summit held in Bagdad in May 1990, Saddam expressed his 
complaints that some Gulf States were hurting Iraq’s economy and compared their 
actions to “economic warfare” against Iraq by exceeding their OPEC oil production 
quotas, telling the gathered Arab leaders that Iraq could not tolerate this pressure any 
longer. He elaborated, “Continuing overproduction of oil, and its consequent effect on 
prices, was a kind of war against Iraq…. we have reached a point where we can no longer 
withstand pressure.”42 However, in this summit, Saddam kept the door open for the 
diplomacy to resolve the oil dispute with Kuwait. Nevertheless, in a July 17, 1990, 
speech on the anniversary of Al-Ba’ath Revolution, Saddam blamed the Iraq’s “economic 
crises” on Kuwait and the UAE, who he accused of exceeding OPEC oil production 
quotas and seeking to push down crude oil prices. In this speech Saddam also said that 
the Iraq of 1990 and beyond would not be the Iraq of 1981, and accused “the Gulf rulers 
as being agents of imperialism, and of waging ‘economic warfare’ on Iraq and at the first 
time he threatened by military intervention to fix this problem.”43 Moreover, Saddam’s 
regime continued its campaign against Kuwait; Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz filed a 
memorandum with the Arab League alleging that Kuwait had exploited the circumstances 
of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) in order to steal $2.5 billion in Iraqi oil from the Rumaila 
field and built military positions in Iraqi territory.44  
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2. Kuwait Response to Iraqi Claims 
Kuwait was able to prevent Saddam from playing the oil prices card by 
maintaining the OPEC oil production quotas that had been agreed to by its members, but 
the stubbornness of the Kuwaiti position, which appeared in the statement of the Kuwaiti 
Oil Minister to the Wall Street Journal that Kuwait would continue exceeding its oil 
quotas and would not adhere with OPEC quotas, increased tensions and gave Saddam a 
reason to escalate the crisis.45 Kuwaitis at that time did not believe that Iraq would 
invade and occupy Kuwait; rather, they thought that Saddam was largely bluffing in an 
attempt to gain leverage in ongoing OPEC talks. Even the pessimists among them 
believed that Saddam would at most seize a Kuwaiti oil field just across the border.  
On July 18, 1990, and as a response to Saddam’s speech, Kuwait’s government 
sent an answering memorandum to the Arab League stating that it had received the Iraqi 
memo with amazement and surprise. Kuwait’s Former Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah 
Al-Ahmed said, “Kuwait set out the material and moral support provided by Kuwait to 
Iraq at all levels.”46 Kuwait rejected all Iraqi claims, stating that it had suffered as much 
as Iraq from the collapse of oil prices and denied Iraq’s allegations that it intended to 
destroy the Iraqi economy. Kuwait also insisted that all oil produced from the Rumaila 
field was from Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait sent several messages to Arab leaders and to the 
Secretary General of the United Nation explaining the Kuwaiti position regarding Iraqi 
claims. Additionally, on July 19, 1990, the UAE responded to Iraqi claims that the UAE 
was attempting to harm Iraq economically, sending a letter to the Secretary General of 
the Arab League that rejected these claims, stating that this way of treating Arab disputes 
was against Arab interests and solidarity. However, Iraq maintained its position regarding 
Kuwait and, further, claimed that Iraq was defending Gulf security. Iraq asserted that 
Kuwait was the first state to benefit from the Iraq-Iran War, but that, even so, Kuwait 
intended to harm Iraq, in service to the “imperial powers” of United States and Europe as 
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Saddam said.47 As the situation between Iraq and Kuwait intensified, many efforts were 
made by Egypt, Jordan, and finally Saudi Arabia to settle the dispute before it exploded.  
3. Efforts to Settle the Dispute 
From the beginning of the crisis between Kuwait and Iraq, all of the attempts at 
resolving the dispute were made by individual nations, except for the discussion within 
OPEC that resulted from Iraq’s complaints that overproduction on the part of some states 
was pushing oil prices down. Before Saddam’s speech of July 17, 1990 and those made 
in response to it, no one believed that this dispute would grow any more serious; thus, the 
only attempts to settle the dispute were made by the King of Jordan, the President of 
Egypt, and the Saudi government. After July 17, efforts to resolve the conflict between 
Iraq and Kuwait took a serious tack, but were still largely friendly attempts on the part of 
individual states, not institutional ones.  
4. The GCC’s Role Prior to the Invasion 
The invasion of Kuwait was the first challenge for the GCC states since its 
creation in 1981. Although Kuwait on July 18, 1990 had requested an emergency meeting 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Kuwait, and had also requested that the Arab League 
intervene, the region’s inclination was to avoid exaggerating tensions, hoping the 
situation would be resolved amicably. For this reason, no meetings took place before Iraq 
invaded Kuwait. The GCC had avoided any meeting before the invasion in the hopes of 
not angering Saddam if it dealt with him collectively. The situation in the region had 
established a complex environment similar to the situation in Europe prior to the World 
War II. None of the Gulf nations wanted to believe that Iraq would invade them, hoping 
instead to satisfy Saddam while at the same time fearing that their attempts to calm the 
conflict between Iraq and Kuwait would be seen as a weakness. There were concerns that 
these overtures would only encourage Saddam to make more demands.  Thus, the GCC  
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did not hold any meetings to discuss the dispute at either the level of Supreme Council or 
at the level of the Council of Ministers. Instead, all the efforts at pacifying Saddam were 
made individually by the member-states.  
5. Attempts to Solve the Crisis After July 17, 1990 
After Saddam escalated the crisis officially through his speech of July 17, 1990, 
and the memorandum he sent to the Arab League, many Arab leaders realized the 
dangerous trend of the crisis after these memorandum and the accusations and new 
language threatening Kuwait that they contained. Even though Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) made concerted efforts to resolve the crises, 
it was too late. The Iraqi army was already positioned near Kuwait’s borders. Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt visited Saddam in Bagdad on July 24, 1990, in an 
attempt to mitigate the tension between Iraq and Kuwait. Saddam promised Mubarak that 
he did not intend to use force against Kuwait and his only goal was to put pressure to 
agree to Iraqi demands on Kuwait.48 Yasser Arafat, the leader of PLO, also tried to calm 
the situation, but Saddam instead sent him to Kuwait to ask for a loan of ten billion 
dollars, which Kuwait refused. Finally, Saudi Arabia made a last-ditch effort, hosting the 
Jeddah Conference between Iraq and Kuwait.49. 
6. The Jeddah Conference   
“When the Kuwaiti-Iraq crisis escalated in the last week of July, King Fahad of 
Saudi Arabia convened a meeting between the two parties to discuss outstanding bilateral 
issues.”50 Saudi Arabia attempts were individual efforts, not collectively, through the 
GCC collectively was supposed to be the case. Saudi Arabia sent its Foreign Minister to 
Bagdad on July 28, 1990, to invite the Iraqi delegation to meet with their Kuwaiti 
counterparts in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The goal of this meeting was to negotiate their 
dispute under the Saudi sponsorship. On the same day, the Foreign Minister went to 
Kuwait and made the same invitation for the Kuwaitis; both Iraq and Kuwait accepted 
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this initiative. The Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Izzet Ibrahim 
ad-Douri, headed Iraqi’s delegation, while Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheik Saad 
Al-Sabah headed Kuwait’s delegation. 
The meeting was held in Jeddah over two sessions. The Iraqi delegation repeated 
its same demands: write-off Iraq’s debts, additional loans, transfer of the Rumaila oil 
field to Iraq, and reimbursement for ten years’ exploitation of the Rumaila field. The 
Kuwaiti delegation refused the Iraqi demands at the beginning, and later stipulated that a 
discussion of the borders had to precede any agreement on the other points of contention. 
The Iraqi delegation refused any discussion other than their demands, and withdrew from 
the meeting, promising to hold other meeting in Iraq and Kuwait later. The negotiation 
lasted for two days without making any progress; on the evening of August 1, 1990, both 
delegations returned to their respective countries and blamed each other for the failure of 
the Jeddah talks.51 There are different accounts to what happen in Jeddah, and the fact is 
that no one knows exactly what happened at that meeting. What is clear is that after the 
talks ended, Iraq invaded Kuwait.  
7. The Invasion 
At 12:00 a.m. on August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops crossed Kuwait’s borders. Iraq had 
been preparing its troops for months before the invasion, and Saddam had chosen the 
month of August because most Kuwaitis were vacationing abroad. Compounding its 
problems, Kuwait had not mobilized its forces in the hopes of avoiding Iraq’s anger; as a 
result, very few troops were stationed at the borders. Even though Kuwait did eventually 
mobilize all of its troops, it could not stop the Iraqi army, the fourth largest in the world 
at that time. Kuwait and the rest of the international community had not expected that 
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to full-scale military conflict. Instead, Saddam occupied the whole of Kuwait, annexing it 
to Al-Basra County. Saddam’s plans also included seizing or killing the prince of Kuwait 
and his family, but most of the ruling family fled to Saudi Arabia.52 
8. GCC’s Role After the Invasion 
Although the GCC member-states had avoided any meeting to discuss the crisis 
between Kuwait and Iraq before the invasion, they quickly called a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers in Cairo on August 3, 1990, condemning the invasion and calling 
for immediate Iraqi withdrawal. They met again in Jeddah on August 7 and demanded 
that Iraq heed the Arab League and U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for its 
withdrawal from Kuwait and rejected any new status that might emerge based on the 
invasion. The GCC also stated that they agreed on the best means to confront the 
invasion. The GCC member-states clearly and explicitly stated that they stood with 
Kuwait against the Iraqi invasion. It was clear that the member-states had understood the 
threat that Iraq and Iran posed to their countries from the time of the GCC’s creation, but 
they had not reached a Collective Security mechanism in preparation for this critical time. 
They only initiated close cooperation when they realized the imminent threat to the 
region, and even then, their primary concern was how to work with the international 
community in order to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.     
9. Saudi Arabia’s Role After the Invasion  
The only person more shocked by the invasion of Kuwait than the Kuwaitis it is 
King Fahad of Saudi Arabia. He was a friend to Saddam Husain and had trusted Saddam 
when he asserted that Iraq would not attack Kuwait. When Saudi Arabia learned of the 
invasion, King Fahad called Saddam to ask what was happening; Saddam told the King 
that he would send Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council Izzet Ibrahim 
ad-Douri to explain the situation to him. However, after ad-Douri emphasized yet again  
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that Kuwait was part of Iraq, while at the same time promising that Iraq would not invade 
Saudi Arabia, King Fahad realized how grave the situation was that had arisen from 
Saddam’s ambitions and adventure. 
For four days after the invasion, Saudi Arabia tried to find an Arab solution to the 
crisis, one based on Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and the Kuwaiti government’s return 
on power, but without success. During that time, Saudi Arabia heard many reports that 
Iraq was mobilizing its troops on the Saudi borders, but the Saudis preferred to wait for 
the Arab League resolution. On August 3, the Arab League agreed on a resolution, which 
called for a solution to the crisis from within the League and warned against outside 
intervention.53 For Saudi Arabia, time was critical, as any delay in withdrawing Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait would put Saudi Arabia under security pressure; to make matters 
worse, no one at that time knew what Saddam’s intentions were. It was a difficult time 
for the Saudi Arabian government, which was both attempting to resolve the crisis and 
dealing with the reports that talked of Iraqi troops mobilizing near the Saudi borders.  
10. Saudi Decision to Call on Foreign Forces 
King Fahad’s decision to request that the U.S. and other nations send troops to 
defend Saudi Arabia against any Iraqi attempt to cross the Saudi-Kuwaiti borders was 
surely the most difficult that any king of Saudi Arabia has made. Prince Khalid bin Sultan 
in his book Desert Warrior claims that the Saudi decision to ask the Americans for help 
was not related to the satellite images that were produced by then-Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney purporting to show Iraqi forces massing on the Saudi borders. Rather, 
bin Sultan states that Saudi Arabia had made a long-standing decision that it would ask 
for outside help if its sovereignty was exposed to threats could not faced by its own 
military forces.54 Although Saudi Arabia had considered the possibility of calling for 
help from outside power if the danger is greater than their ability to meet it in drawing up 
its military strategy, the satellite images obtained by the Americans finally convinced 
King Fahad that the threat was imminent and that it was the time to put this strategy into 
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action. Saudi Arabia’s decision to ask for U.S. assistance was made as an individual state, 
not as a GCC decision. They may have coordinated with the other GCC states in other 
areas, but not in making the request. It was a decision for self-survival in the face of an 
imminent threat. 55 
11. GCC Role During the Military Build-Up 
The Invasion of Kuwait was the most serious challenge that the GCC had faced 
up to that time. It would have been better able to respond to this crisis if its members had 
put their internal disputes aside and thought strategically of the GCC as a regime created 
after they all agreed on its norms, principles, and roles. Instead, they had spent ten years 
following the council’s creation moving slowly in the direction of the main reason for its 
establishment—collective security to face a regional crisis. The GCC member-states had 
not realized that Iraq could be a threat to them one day, but, failing to understand that an 
Iraqi government that killed its own people would be anything other than friendly to its 
neighbors, instead believed that any conflict in the region would come from Iran. As a 
result, they had not prepared for that point; despite having created a Peninsula Shield 
army, they continued to have differing visions of its staffing, role, and leadership.  
Finally, the GCC realized that it was weak and understood that the threat posed by 
Iraq was real and imminent. As posited in the Neorealist theory of alliances (that is, states 
cooperate to balance against threats), the GCC did come together in the face of Saddam’s 
aggression, but only after one of its member-states was forcibly occupied. The member-
sates finally put aside their disputes and overcame all of the other obstacles that had 
prevented them from achieving the collective security required to protect them from 
regional threats. They cooperated and coordinated with each other in all areas, whether 
political, economic, or military. Politically, they affirmed the Arab League and Security 
Council resolutions that called for withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the return 
of the Kuwaiti government. Economically, they offered liquidity and funded the military 
build-up of the international coalition force that was formed by thirty-four nations, led by 
the United States, to push Iraq out from Kuwait. Militarily, the “four Gulf countries- 
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Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman- decided not to take part in the 
military operations because of their relatively small military forces, but they participated 
logistically and by offering technical supports.”56  
12. GCC Role After the Liberation of Kuwait 
After exhausting all diplomatic efforts to convince Saddam’s regime to withdraw 
from Kuwait, the international coalition waged a war against Iraq; this alliance defeated 
Iraq and liberated Kuwait. Following the war, the GCC held many meeting at all levels in 
order to further its efforts to reach to collective security mechanism to protect against any 
new threat. However, they failed to reach to a collective agreement about many proposals 
offered by various member-states. Instead, they preferred to sign a bilateral security 
agreement with the United States, Britain and France. These agreements, which are still 
in place today, had the continuing result of hindering the GCC’s efforts to reach to 
collective security.  
B. IRAN AS A THREAT  
In literature about the tense relations between Iran and the GCC states, it is 
common to find writers who view these tensions as an Arab-Persian struggle for control 
of the Gulf. Others relate it to the Arab-Muslim devastation of the Sassanid Empire and 
the resulting alteration of Persian to Islam; still others ascribe the tensions to a historic 
struggle for power and domination between Sunnis and Shi’ites in Islam. The history of 
Iran shows that it has long competed for regional power; it is not only ideology that 
influences the relationship between them. Iran’s ambitions for hegemony began after 
Britain’s withdrawal from its Gulf colonies following World War II. For instance, Iran’s 
occupation of the United Arab Emirates’ Islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Leaser 
Tunb were an example of this tension between the new Arab Gulf states and Iran before 
the creation of the GCC.57 
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Iran under the Shah had seen itself as the dominant power in the region because of 
its demographic weight, unique location, and economic. Prior to the Islamic Revolution 
and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the Shi’ite ideology was 
not the incentive behind the regional ambitions. During the rule of the Shah, tensions 
between Iran and its neighbors were all about hegemony and domination over the Gulf. 
Moreover, the Shah’s elimination of religious factions and his secular policy of 
modernization in the Western style led to the revolution against his rule. This thesis 
focuses only on the tension between Iran and the GCC after the Revolution of 1979.   
1. The Revolution of 1979 
The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 added a religious element to the 
hegemony, one that has shaped Iran’s foreign policy toward its Arab neighbors in the 
Gulf. New Iranian leaders called for exporting the revolution to the whole Islamic world 
especially to the Arab States. Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the new leader of 
Iran, used religion to challenge the Gulf State rulers’ legitimacy. The use of religion to 
destabilize the internal security of the Gulf States escaladed the tensions between them 
and Iran on sectarian bases. Iran encouraged the Shi’ite communities in the Gulf States to 
revolt against their rulers in order to join Iran, thus establishing the Islamic states or the 
umma, with Iran as the only “Government of God” at its core. As a result, widespread 
riots erupted in the Shi’ite towns in Bahrain and in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia 
in 1979–80, while Kuwait and Iraq were subjected to terrorist attacks. Iraq suffered from 
most of these attacks, which alarmed all the governments of the Gulf states.58 
It was the first time that Iraq and the Gulf states had faced this kind of threat. 
They were accustomed to facing the ambitions of Shah of Iran that were based on interest 
and hegemony. The Shah’s regime was satisfied when his ambitions were achieved, but 
the new theocratic regime in Iran mixed interest with ideology. It used religion as a tool 
in its attempt to remove the governments of the other Gulf states. While Iraq and the  
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GCC states had been able to tolerate Iran under the Shah in the past, they could not 
tolerate the new Iranian agenda. This Iranian threat to Iraq was one of the factors that led 
Saddam to begin the war with Iran in 1980, which lasted for eight years.  
2. Iraq-Iran War 
The Iraq-Iran War lasted for more than eight years, a period in which both states 
suffered severe causalities and billions of dollars in damage. It began when Iraq invaded 
Iran in September 1980. Different issues led to the war, but the fundamental cause lay in 
the long-standing regional rivalry between Persian Iran and Arab Iraq. Although the 
immediate cause was a border dispute,59 other causes led Iraq to begin the war. Iraq 
wanted to put an end to the religious propaganda directed against the secular Iraqi regime 
by Iran. Iraq had suffered many Iranian terrorist attacks on Iraqi officials, and Iraq feared 
that the influence of Iranian revolution would inspire Iraq’s Shi’ite to rise up against the 
Iraqi government, which had oppressed them for many years. Iraq also sought to exploit 
the chaos and weakness of Iran’s military after the Revolution in order to gain control of 
oil field territories, and to replace Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf States. 
Although Iraq experienced early successes in the first two years of the war, Iran stopped 
the Iraqi forces in middle of 1981 and took the offensive initiative through actions such 
as Operation Jerusalem.60 In 1982, Iran forced out all Iraqi forces from Iranian 
territory; it rejected all cease-fire proposals from the Iraqi side, and continued the war, 
aiming to punish Iraq and overthrow Saddam.61 
From 1982 to 1987, Iran was on the offensive and Iraq was on the defensive. Iran 
had launched offensive attack and, regained all lost territory by June 1982. Moreover, 
Iran pursued its offensive move and invaded Iraq in an attempt to capture Al Basra, but 
Iraq resisted. In contrast, Iraq started a war of attrition after 1982. Donations and 
financing from the Arab Gulf States aided Iraq to obtain modern weapons from the West 
and the Soviet Union, while Iran had only limited access to the international weapons 
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market.62 Because aid provided by the Arab Gulf States enabled Iraq to shift the balance 
of the war, Iran began to attack the oil tankers of those Gulf States that were aiding Iraq. 
The United States became involved in the war when Kuwait raised the U.S. flag on its 
tankers targeted by Iran. Iran and United States fought insignificant naval battles during 
1987–1988. Finally, the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988 after Iran forces collapsed under a 
string of successful Iraqi offensives, which forced Khomeini to accept the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 598, amounting to an Iraqi victory in the war.63  
The Iraq-Iran War shaped the future of Iran-Arab Gulf State relations through the 
1980s. While the GCC States formed to develop a collective security mechanism against 
the threat from Iran and due to their fears that revolution would be exported to their 
countries from their Islamic rival Iran, the GCC states stood largely by Iraq in its war 
against Iran. Each state charted its own path regarding Iran, however. Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait backed Iraq’s war efforts by providing Saddam with billions of dollars as loans. 
The United Arab Emirates was split; while Dubai and others remain neutral, the 
government took the same position as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did. As a consequence of 
to the GCC states’ position of supporting Iraq in the war, they became legitimate targets 
for the Iranians. Kuwait was subject to many Iranian terrorist attacks and the Iranian navy 
targeted their oil tankers, as mentioned above. Saudi Arabia was subject to different 
Iranian terrorist operations. Moreover, Iran exploited the Hajj, or pilgrimage, season to 
destabilize Saudi internal security.  
3. Hajj Demonstration in 1987 
Because Iran saw itself as the defender of Shi’ite Islam and attempted to spread 
the Shi’ite revolution throughout the Arab world, it made intensive efforts to destabilize 
the Gulf States’ security and to delegitimize Saudi control over the holy sites, Mecca and 
Medina. “The Iranian leadership made concerted efforts to convince the Muslim world 
that Saudi Arabia was not fit to control the Saudi holy sites of Mecca and Medina.”64 The 
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Gulf states’ stand with Iraq in its war against Iran motivated the Iranians to use the Hajj 
seasons to destabilize Saudi security and the safety of the pilgrims in retaliation for that 
support and in order to put pressure on Saudi Arabia to stop aiding Iraq. To do so, Iranian 
pilgrims rioted in the holy city of Mecca in 1987, which resulted in the death of 400 
people. Saudi Arabia, in a move to counter Iranian efforts to use the Hajj to destabilize its 
internal security, succeeded in passing at an Islamic summit a proposed system of pilgrim 
quotas that restricted the number of Iranian pilgrims. Iran was then accused of being 
behind the two bombs that exploded in Mecca in 1989 in retaliation for the Saudi quota 
system.65  
Iranian efforts to exporting the revolution generally lessened after Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s death in 1989. Although Iran restored diplomatic relations with the Gulf 
states after the Liberation of Kuwait in 1990, improving its relationship with the GCC, it 
was alleged that Iran was involved in Khobar Towers bombing in 1996.66 Iran kept its 
relations with the Gulf states moderate until 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq. The 
United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq created a new opportunity for Iran to dominate the 
Gulf. The invasion of Iraq shifted Iranian policy from meter threats of interference in the 
Gulf to actual interference, and from threats of hegemony to actual hegemony.   
4. The Impact of the United States’ 2003 Invasion of Iraq  
The U.S. and British invasion of Iraq in 2003 further shifted the regional balance 
of power in the Gulf and created a new challenge for the GCC member-states. The GCC 
states have followed a strategy based on ensuring a balance of power between Iraq and 
Iran that prevented either of them from dominating the Gulf. As Stansfield observes, 
“The Gulf security architecture had been largely built upon the presence of two principal 
political and military forces (Iran-Iraq).”67 However, the United States’ 2003 invasion of 
Iraq removed Saddam’s regime, destroyed Iraqi armed forces and security services, and  
 
                                                 
65 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia, 20. 
66 Ibid., 21. 
67 Gareth Stansfield, “Gulf Security Following the Invasion of Iraq” in Arabian Gulf Security Internal 
and External Challenges (The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2008), 117. 
 33 
broke up its central government. As a result, Iraq became fragile and Iran benefited from 
this situation to fill the vacuum in the balance of power, emerging as a dominant power in 
the Gulf. 
This change in the balance of power in the Gulf also brought a new government to 
Iraq that was dominated by Shi’ites. From the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the 
GCC states have been concerned about the influence of Iranian Shi’ism on their Shi’ite 
communities. The consequences of the invasion led to a Shi’ite majority in Iraq gaining 
power after the removal of Saddam’s regime. Therefore, in the eyes of the GCC States 
the new government in Iraq raised two concerns. The first was the indirect threat of Iran 
embodied in the new opportunity for Iran to exert more influence over Shi’ites inside the 
GCC. The second was the direct threat of Iran, embodied in Iraqi cooperation with Iran or 
the manipulation of the Iraqi government by Iran, against the GCC States.  
In the first case, it is a fact that the new Shi’ite government in Iraq has 
strengthened Shi’ite aspirations that had been suppressed for many years, deepening 
sectarian divisions throughout the region, which Iran could exploit in order to manipulate 
the region. As stated earlier, Iran’s policy of exporting its Islamic revolution has poisoned 
Iran-GCC relations. According to this ideology, security in the Gulf will not be achieved 
unless the populations of the Arab nations rebel against their ruling monarchs and create 
governments similar to Iran’s. This ideology was revived by changes in Iraq’s political 
order after the invasion of 2003. It is now easier for Iran to spread its ideology not only 
throughout the Gulf, but also throughout the Middle East as a whole.  
Iran’s influence in Lebanon and Palestine can be seen as a part of an Iranian 
policy of challenging the GCC’s role in the region. The GCC member-states anxiously 
monitor Iranian influence through Hizballah in Lebanon, and through Hamas in Palestine; 
this influence reinforces their concerns about Iranian interference in Arab domestic 
issues. Moreover, the region’s sectarian tension has grown to greater levels than at any 





exploiting it, GCC leaders have taken this issue into consideration, which led King Fahad 
of Saudi Arabia to pay attention to Saudi Shi’ite demands and to host a 2005 meeting 
with their delegation in Jeddah.68 
In the second case, the GCC has worried about the future of relations between 
Iran and the new government in Iraq and their consequences on the GCC security. The 
GCC is especially concerned about the new alliance between Iran and Iraq, Lebanon, 
Syria, and Palestine. The tension in Lebanon after the Israeli attacks of 2006 and 
Hizballah’s attempt to occupy Beirut in 2008, showed the extent to which Iranian 
interference in Arab domestic politics has reached. Iran policy following the United 
States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq has passed through two stages, the era of President 
Mohammad Khatami, and that of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, which began with his 
election in 2005. 
During the Khatami era, Iran’s main strategy was a defensive one, focused on 
avoiding any aggression from United States against Iran, and on benefitting from the 
invasion by supporting the Shi’ite leaders in consolidating their rule after the fall of 
Saddam’s Sunni regime. As a result, the GCC attempted to use the moderate policies of 
Khatami as a means of developing its relationship with Iran, calling for a new collective 
security arrangement that would bring Yemen, Iraq, and Iran into partnership with the 
GCC member-states and that would assign the role of security guarantor to the U.N. 
Security Council.69 
5. Iran’s Rising Regional Ambitions 
Since the election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran’s regional 
policy has become more ambitious, reflecting his hegemonic ambitions in the region. He 
has escalated the tone of Iran’s rhetoric against U.S. and Israel in order to gain Arab 
street support and to challenge the GCC’s moderate position on regional problems. Iran’s 
exploitation of Arab problems has negatively affected the GCC’s role in the region, 
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especially that of Saudi Arabia, whose position has weakened in recent years. Iran’s 
newly hostile policy towards the GCC and the greater Arab world has succeeded to some 
extent. It has employed a nonsectarian policy that focuses on the people in the street in 
order to build supporters for its policy by supporting Arab rights. As Frederic Wehrey et 
al., point out, “Since the election of Ahmadinejad, Iran has pursued what can be best 
described as an aggressively nonsectarian ‘Arab Street’ strategy that appeals to Arab 
publics by emphasizing Iran’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, opposition to 
Western imperialism in the region.”70   
Another important concern arising from Ahmadinejad’s policy is Iran’s attempt to 
develop nuclear energy. The Iranian nuclear program is neither new nor secret, but recent 
information shows that Iran has pursued a top-secret military program that could result in 
it developing unclear weapons. Although Iran has asserted many times that its program is 
for peaceful purposes, there is a great deal of mistrust between Iran and the international 
community due to a number of secret facilities, which it refused to open to International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. The consequences of this program could 
affect the GCC States not only politically, but could also lead to environmental disaster 
and maritime pollution.71 
C. CONCLUSION 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the current Iranian threat to the GCC states both 
demonstrate how the weakness of the GCC member-states has led to their failure to reach 
a collective security mechanism to protect them from any changes to the balance of 
power in one of the most important regions in the world. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 
after different claims and allegations against Kuwait, including that of stealing its oil 
from the shared Romailah and of the destroying Iraqi economy by overproducing oil. 
According to Iraq, this led to the oil prices to collapse at the time that Iraq needed to 
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repay the money that it had borrowed to finance its war against Iran. The Invasion of 
Kuwait ended after a war led by United States and international coalition. Saudi Arabia 
had played the main role in its creation in order to stop Saddam from moving onto Saudi 
territory. The war ended after seven months, but it opened the door to the GCC’s role in 
developing a mechanism that could guarantee the collective security of its member-states. 
The second case examined how the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its 
commitment to exporting revolution to the Gulf region escalated the tension between Iran 
and its Gulf neighbors to new stage of rivalry. During the war between Iraq and Iran, the 
GCC States stood with the regime in Iraq against Iran, which increased tensions between 
them. The United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent removal of Saddam, the 
destruction of its military power, and its new, Iranian-supported Shi’ite government all 
shifted the balance of power in the region toward Iran’s interests. The election of 
Ahmadinejad, who is consider a hardliner and has ambitions for hegemony, in 2005 as 
Iranian President, led Iran to begin a new, more aggressive strategy toward the Gulf states 
and the region. This strategy is based on street support by taking the same strong position 
that the Arab leaders took against Israel regarding Palestine to undermine their legitimacy 
in their population’s opinion. At the same time, Iran has pursued a controversial nuclear 
program that has inflamed suspicions about links with military programs aimed at 
producing nuclear weapons. Iran is also accused by many GCC member-states of 
interference in their domestic issues. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain accuse Iran of upsetting 
their internal stability by encouraging their Shi’ite population to rebel against them. All 
of these Iranian challenges to the GCC member states underscore how the GCC has failed 
to reach a common agreement on the mechanism of collective security that could face 
these challenges.  
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III. ANALYSIS 
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s abysmal performance during the last thirty-plus 
years clearly demonstrates that this alliance remains unprepared to seriously commit 
itself to the establishment of a credible joint defense force able to facilitate the goal of 
collective security for which the GCC was established in the first place. Many analysts 
who have examined the GCC’s limited ability to achieve this goal have identified 
numerous internal and external strains on the alliance. These strains have limited the 
alliance’s efforts to reach a consensus on the mechanism or mechanisms that are required 
in order to decrease the GCC’s reliance on external powers for security, rather than 
achieving this desired security through the GCC itself. 
After the Second Gulf War in 1990, the GCC attempted to strengthen the 
capabilities of the existing Peninsula Shield forces, but after evaluating different 
proposed courses of action individual member-states ended up using independent 
bilateral agreements between themselves and the United States and the European Union 
to meet the security concerns within the Gulf region. However, following the United 
States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent tipping of the balance of power towards 
Iran, the members of the GCC quickly renewed their efforts at strengthening the alliance 
into a credible entity. The involvement of Iran in Arab affairs in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, 
and Palestine parallel its military build-up and its ambition of acquiring nuclear weapons 
have shown that they have been too slow in making substantial progress, but once again 
these events associated with the Arab uprisings may serve as a further catalyst for 
reinvigorating the GCC. 
The following analysis will examine the GCC’s evolution since its inception 
through the lenses of neorealist theory and regime theory. Neorealist theory predicts that 
states will establish alliances when they perceive a rising, credible threat; however, the 
duration of this alliance will only be as long as the threat or threats which the alliance 
was established to address remain credible in the eyes of the alliance’s members. 
Furthermore, the states will abandon this alliance if other options for collective security 
become available. In other words, in the specific case of the GCC, neorealism argues that 
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collective security is doomed to failure because of the self-help nature of anarchy; thus, it 
does not expect the GCC to succeed if there are other options for providing security 
against Iraq or Iran. Does this prediction about alliances mean that the GCC has remained 
weak since its inception and will continue to do so, or does it predict that the GCC will 
cease to exist altogether? Neorealism expects that if any alliance fails to reach the full 
expectations of its members they will then seek another alliance. This happened in the 
case of the GCC, when each of the individual members established bilateral alliances 
with Western powers, primarily the United States and the European Union. These 
bilateral agreements have not completely replaced the GCC, however. It continues to 
exist, but it has remained weak from the time of its creation, which is in line with the 
arguments presented by neorealist theory. In order to gain a more thorough 
comprehension of this important matter, one must reach a true understanding of which 
factors have contributed to the weak nature of the GCC, which is so weak, in fact, that its 
members felt they needed to establish bilateral alliances in the first place.     
Regime theory provides an explanation for why the GCC has remained weak 
throughout its existence. This chapter will examine through the lens of this theory the 
factors that have caused the GCC’s long-term weakness. As stated previously, a regime is 
a “set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors and expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.”72 This definition permits the GCC to be looked at as a regime. From this 
perspective, any incoherency among the components of the regime would make the GCC 
a weak regime. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981 in the face of two 
perceived threats to region: the first was the Iran-Iraq War, which raged on from 1980 to 
1989, and the second was a clearly revisionist Iran, which had begun to encourage or 
sponsor subversive movements through out the region and which therefore posed a direct 
and proximate threat to the GCC member-states’ continued existence. Accordingly, these 
states put aside their rivalries and established the GCC. Just as neorealist theory would 
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predict, the Gulf States came together because of their security concerns associated with 
these significant threats. It was in this spirit that the Gulf states formed the alliance that is 
now known as the Gulf Cooperation Council. All of this is compatible with the principles 
of neorealist theory. Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait demonstrated that despite ten years 
of existence as an alliance, the GCC was unable to achieve its primary purpose of 
collective security. Why was this the case? The answer is that GCC was unable to 
provide collective security because it was a weak alliance, or in terms of regime theory, it 
is a weak regime. This weakness stemmed from incoherence among the components of 
the regime, which according to regime theory are principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures, or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior.  In the 
case of the GCC, the actual practice of the rules and decision-making procedures within 
the GCC are increasingly inconsistent with the GCC’s Principles, norms that are 
mentioned in its Charter. Accordingly, they prohibited the alliance from effectively 
taking collective action in support of the region’s security interests.  
Principles, as defined by Stephen Krasner, are “beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude.” Norms are “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.”  
In the case of the GCC, the member-states share similar social values, political systems, 
economic programs, and norms. In terms of social values, the member-states all share the 
same religion, Islam, and share the same customs, values, and culture, specific to the 
Arabs who live on the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, these member-states are 
predominantly monarchical political systems where power is concentrated at the top of a 
highly centralized system. Economically, they are all oil-producing countries that have 
amassed great wealth through the exploitation of their natural resources. These common 
principles and norms have allowed the GCC to remain an alliance since 1981. 
According to regime theory, the rules, as mentioned earlier, are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action; in other words, rules dictate what can or cannot 
be done within an alliance. As an example, Krasner points to the use of diplomatic cover 
by spies, the assassination of diplomats by terrorists, and the failure to provide adequate 
local police protection as indications that the entire classic regime protecting foreign 
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envoys has weakened.73 In the case of the GCC, the examples mentioned in the first 
chapter, that is, the bilateral security agreement between its members and the Western 
powers and the bilateral free trade agreement with United States reached by Bahrain and 
Qatar, have increasingly weakened the GCC and made its principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures less coherent. This, in turn, has led to the GCC becoming a 
weak regime. In contrast, a strong regime facilitates the execution of collective action and 
is an important form of cooperation that is essential if states are to unify in order to 
accomplish specified goals in any type of alliance.  
Because rules indicate how the members of a regime should commit to their 
obligations, any violations of these rules would reflected in the decision-making 
procedures, that is, the “prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
security.”74 Krasner argues, “If the principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly less 
coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, 
and procedures, then a regime has weakened.”75 In other words, the weakening of a 
regime implies incoherence among the apparatuses of the regime or a contradiction 
between the regime and its related behavior.  
This thesis argues that the it is not the factors of principles or norms which have 
limited the GCC as a regime from developing into a strong entity which effectively 
accomplishes the collective security for which it was founded; rather, the critical factor 
which has kept the GCC weak is the lack of coherence between its rules and decision-
making procedures and the principles and norms of the GCC.  
The following analysis examines three critical time periods during the past thirty-
plus years and demonstrates how the causes and results that resulted in the GCC alliance 
has remained weak and ineffective due to problems with rule-based obligations. It also 
considers the actual practices in the regime’s decision-making procedures that have 
                                                 




become increasingly inconsistent with the other components of the regime. First, this 
thesis will examine the period beginning with the GCC’s creation in 1981 and ending 
with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Second, it will examine the period from 
Kuwait’s liberation by coalition forces in 1991 until the United States’ 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. Last, it will analyze the period following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 until the start 
of the uprisings throughout the Arab world in 2011, and more specifically those that have 
directly impacted the GCC member-states. 
A. FROM ESTABLISHMENT TO INVASION OF KUWAIT (1981-1990) 
Problems surrounding compliance with rules and decision-making procedures 
have haunted the GCC since its inception, and were significantly highlighted when the 
GCC was unable to effectively provide collective security in support of Kuwait in 1990. 
Several factors, such as territorial disputes, fear of Saudi Arabian hegemony, concern 
about the exploitation of a powerful military force against member-state ruling families, 
and the problem of command and control over the Peninsula Shield have had a negative 
impact on the alliance’s rules and decision-making processes. This has led to the 
weakening of the GCC, as predicted by regime theory, and has forced its members to 
seek new forms of alliance to meet their security concerns, as neorealist theory predicted. 
First, issues of territorial sovereignty, such as border disputes among the GCC 
member-states, negatively impacted its ability to effectively carry out decision-making 
processes. During this time, numerous disputes over borders dominated the political 
discourse among the GCC member-states. Disputes existed and continue to exist between 
Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar islands and the Dibal and Jarada shoals.76 
Additionally, Richard Schofield points out, “Saudi Arabia had territorial disputes with 
Qatar. These two states were at odds over where their respective territory began and 
where it ended based on the arbitrary lines drawn by the British in the Anglo-Saudi 
Dammam conference of February 1952.”77 One incident in which this dispute manifested 
itself was the Khafus Incident, a military dispute between Saudi and Qatar forces in 
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vicinity of the city of Khafus, beginning in early 1990 and escalating in 1992.78 Other 
disputes have taken place between Saudi Arabia and Oman.79 These incidents are 
representative of the numerous issues regarding sovereign territory that have led to 
mounting tensions. These tensions have directly impacted the ability of these states to 
make sound decisions regarding collective security. As is mentioned in Article Ten of the 
GCC Charter, the council has a Commission for the Settlement of Disputes; the Supreme 
Council is required to establish this commission for every case on an ad hoc basis, in 
accordance with the dispute. However, the failure to maintain these rules and procedures 
has negatively impacted the leadership’s decision-making procedures. In the highly 
centralized, monarchial political systems that are characteristic of the GCC member-
states, these tensions became personal. As a result, decisions have often been based on 
the personal self-interests of the ruling elites who allowed these negative interactions to 
dominate their overall decision-making processes even if it contradicts the GCC’s 
strategic interests.  
Another significant issue that has had a direct impact on decision-making 
procedures within the GCC alliance was the foreboding fears that Saudi Arabian 
dominance of the regime would leads to its hegemony. As Kristian Ulrichsen states in 
“Internal and External Security in the Arab Gulf States,” “lingering intraregional disputes 
and fears of Saudi hegemony on the part of the smaller member-states have hampered 
progress towards security cooperation, which has lagged behind economic integration.”80 
Despite statements in the GCC’s charter that declare all members equal partners in the 
alliance, the smaller Gulf states are fearful that Saudi Arabia will use its economic and 
military weight to dominate the council, similar to the manner in which the United States 
dominates NATO. Terms used in Gulf area media, such as calling Saudi Arabia the “big 
brother” of the region, has negative connotations for the smaller states. Once again, in a 
political system dominated by a centralized political elite, rulers in the smaller states take 
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such matters personally and will often act counter to the wishes or desires of Saudi 
Arabia, simply in order to ensure that their presence is felt as an equal player within the 
alliance. The state’s long-range interests take a second place, behind the short-term 
personal interests of the ruling elites. 
A third factor which has affected decision-making procedures and weakened the 
regime was the prevalent fear that the creation of a powerful military force, in this case 
the Peninsula Shield, would gain enough power in the hands of a military leader who 
could pose a threat to the existing ruling families. As a result the Peninsula Shield has 
served primarily as a symbolic military force, which was representative of the region’s 
united efforts towards collective security. Since the end of World War II, and particularly 
in the decade of the 1970s, military coups throughout the Middle East have appeared to 
be the fashion of the day. Within the context of this perception of strong military forces 
in the Middle East, it was the view of the Gulf rulers that any benefits gained by 
establishing an effective standing military force were far outweighed by the risks 
incurred, because “professional standing armies have a tendency to eventually seize the 
power in the Arab Middle East”81 Fresh memories of monarchies being supplanted by 
military coups weighed heavily on the minds of the GCC member-states monarchical 
rulers. For example, in Egypt the monarchy was replaced by a coup, which eventually 
ended with the establishment of a military-led government, one that is still in power to 
this day. Similarly, coup in Libya led by Muammar Qaddafi and military coups in Iraq 
before the days of Saddam Hussein served as fearful reminders of the might that could be 
wielded by such powerful military forces. This fear affected the alliance’s decision-
making, in that it constrained the GCC states’ strategic foresight. This subverted sound 
collective security considerations to their personal political interests, in order to ensure 
that the Peninsula Shield did not put their respective ruling positions at risk. Nor would 
these leaders tip the balance of power within the GCC in any more in Saudi Arabia’s 
favor than it naturally was, due to the country’s great size and wealth. 
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The final factor, which has a significant impact on the decision-making 
procedures of the GCC, is related to the most important part of any collective security-
based alliance: command and control. The first contributor to poor command and control 
was the inadequate interoperability at all levels within the GCC states’ respective 
militaries. As mentioned in Chapter I, Cordesman argues that there is a lack of progress 
in developing effective required information technology, and failure to develop C4I and 
IS&R and net-centric systems that could tie together the forces of the GCC states. These 
technological issues severely hamper the different military forces belonging to each of 
the GCC states in their efforts at effectively planning, coordinating, and executing 
military operations, impacting decision-making procedures on several levels. This 
technical inoperability across forces limits the ability of forces from the various GCC 
member-states from sharing common intelligence and operational pictures, synchronizing 
operations, and sharing strategic, operational, and tactical information in a timely 
manner. 
The second contributor to poor command and control is that there has been great 
anxiety and debate about the proper manner in which to establish command relationships 
within the military elements of the GCC. Rather than following the model used by such 
alliances as NATO, which have a delineated command and control hierarchy, no such 
structure was implemented when the Peninsula Shield was created. As a result, it was 
unclear who would be in command of which forces and how the command relationships 
would play out when it was time to use the force for military operations in support of 
collective security requirements. At the time the Peninsula Shield was created, Kuwait, 
Oman, and the United Arab Emirates proposed the following command and control 
structure: command and control would reside in Riyadh during normal periods; however, 
in times when the Peninsula Shield is called upon to support a member of the GCC, 
command and control would resort to the country in which the Peninsula Shield is to be 
utilized. This insistence made by the smaller GCC member-states is a clear indication that 




notion that the Peninsula Shield was more of a symbolic testament to collective security 
than a concerted effort to field a strong military force capable of providing for the 
alliance’s collective needs. 
From its inception in 1981 until the first significant challenge it faced, posed by 
Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, it was apparent that the formation of the GCC was 
mostly symbolic in nature and did not fulfill the collective security requirements for 
which it was created. The personal interests of ruling families in the different countries’ 
respective monarchial political systems, their inherent suspicion of strong standing 
militaries, and ineffective command and control structures all constrained the potential 
effectiveness of the GCC. As a result, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a member-state, went 
unchallenged by the rest of the GCC. This proved to all its members that the GCC and its 
Peninsula Shield were inadequate institutions for meeting the member-states’ respective 
security concerns. As stated by regime theory, the problem in the decision-making 
procedures that constrain the GCC from achieving collective security made it a weak 
regime. It was apparent that something more effective was needed to meet these security 
requirements, and in line with neorealism theorists’ predictions, this ineffective alliance 
caused its members to seek an alternate solution. The next significant time period this 
thesis analyzes is the period immediately following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 until 
the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
B. FROM THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED STATES’ 
2003 INVASION OF IRAQ (1991–2003) 
During this period, many important events occurred which had a significant 
impact on sustaining the weak nature of the GCC. It is important to note that the GCC’s 
inability to provide an appropriate and adequate response to the invasion of one of its 
member-states caused the GCC to reflect on its failures, which in turn led to a 
reinvigorated desire to achieve collective security. However, the GCC failed to attain a 
feasible and acceptable solution based on the recommendations of the Oman proposal, 
ignored a call to increase Peninsula Shield forces to 100,000 soldiers, and went against 
the provisions of the Declaration of Damascus, which called for a security structure that 
would ensure Pan-Arab expansion. Furthermore, the disagreement over relations with 
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Iran that followed the Iranian positive position from the Second Gulf War, the 
disagreement over the consequences of the Madrid Conference in 1992 over the peace 
process between the Arab and Israel, the development of disputes between Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar after 1992 contributed to increased levels of tension amongst the alliance’s 
members, and the fact that Saddam Hussein had remained in power following his military 
defeat at the hands of the international coalition in 1990 provided much reason for 
security concerns. For all of these reasons, the GCC remained weak and the member-
states had to seek alternative means of achieving security. The solution was a series of 
bilateral agreements made between the individual GCC member-states and the United 
States and European Union. Once again, neorealist theory predicted this. As the theory 
contends, an alliance that does not meet the security requirements of its members will 
force those members to seek different means of meeting those requirements. This also 
supports the argument made by the regime theory that states that if the components of the 
regime become less coherent, or if actual practices are increasingly inconsistent with each 
other, the regime will remain weak as decision-making procedures are negatively 
impacted by the actions of its members; this was the case in the GCC’s continuing 
weakness of the GCC as a regime.  
The first significant issue that had a direct impact on decision-making procedures 
within the GCC alliance after the liberation of Kuwait arose when the GCC failed to 
reach a consensus on Oman’s proposal calling for an expansion of the Peninsula Shield to 
100,000 soldiers. The Oman proposal was bold and ambitious, and would have increased 
the military capabilities of the GCC states, in addition to representing a new stage for the 
Peninsula Shield by setting important strategic and defensive goals for this joint force. 
However, the reasons given to justify non-implementation of the proposal (that is, 
technical difficulties and manpower requirements) reflected problems in the decision-
making procedure at a strategic level that increased the feeling among the GCC’s 
member-states that it was hopelessly weak. This failure and weakness directly impacted 
the ability of these states to make sound decisions regarding collective security and once 
again, as predicted by neorealism, the GCC states in this situation would seek other 
options that could guarantee their survival and security.  
 47 
The second significant impact affecting the vision of the collective security of the 
GCC was the “Declaration of Damascus,” which called for a security structure that 
ensured Pan-Arab expansion, and that was signed by the foreign ministers of the GCC 
and those of Syria and Egypt in March 1991. “The expressed purpose of the March 6, 
1991 Damascus Declaration was to define a workable collective security structure 
involving the GCC states, Syria and Egypt.”82 The background of this agreement referred 
to the situation at the end of the Second Gulf War in 1991, of which Syria and Egypt 
were a part. Syria and Egypt had had an important and strategic role in the coalition that 
was created to defend Saudi Arabian territory and to liberate Kuwait. The participation 
and role of these two states in the coalition had created many difficulties for Saudi Arabia 
in justifying the legitimacy of the coalition among Arabs and the Islamic world. 
Furthermore, the strong performance of the Syrian and Egyptian troops in the ground 
campaign against Iraq and the battle to liberate Kuwait encouraged the GCC to reach an 
agreement to deploy Syrian and Egyptian troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to defend 
them against Iraq. This agreement, known as the “Declaration of Damascus,” emphasized 
that this force would be the nucleus of a Pan-Arab force that could achieve collective 
Arab peninsula security in future. However, this arrangement was neglected and never 
applied, and few months later, Egyptian and Syrian troops withdrew from Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. The retraction of the Declaration of Damascus can be traced to the 
difference in Egypt and Syria’s views of security priorities regarding Iran, versus the 
three different views prevalent among the GCC member-states. Kuwait was primarily 
concerned for its self-survival after liberation, while Saudi Arabia wanted to create a Pan-
Arab security regime in order to achieve Arab collective security. Once again, the self-
security and self-interest of the smaller GCC member-states negatively impacted 
decision-making procedures that were supposed to strengthen the GCC as a whole and 
prevented any further progress on this new project. As a result, the small GCC states saw 
that the GCC was too weak as a regime to achieve the goal of collective security, pushing 
the GCC to seek alternative security options. 
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The third factor that increased the GCC’s weakness was a disagreement over 
relations with Iran and Israel that arose after the liberation of Kuwait and the Madrid 
Conference of 1990. These two issues contributed an important element blocking further 
cooperation during the 1990’s that eroded consensus within the GCC. Indeed, it is true 
that during the 1990’s, the different attitudes assumed by Gulf States toward Iran and 
Israel were another point of divergence between them. Thus, in addition to their border 
disputes, it is important to consider the fact that some of the member-states advocated 
improving ties with Iran (as did Qatar and Oman), while others maintained a more 
cautious approach (as did Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) and that similar disputes concerning 
Israel occurred, in explaining the erosion of consensus within the GCC.83 
A fourth factor had a significant impact not only on decision-making procedures 
but also on the norms of the GCC regime’s components. This was the tension that 
developed between Saudi Arabia and Qatar after the liberation of Kuwait. Two incidents 
have caused this tension; first, the border dispute, which began and escalated after 1992’s 
Khafus Incident; second, the tension that followed the bloodless coup in Qatar in 1995. 
Qatar under the former Emir had tended to see Saudi Arabia as a big brother in the GCC, 
based on its weight as the largest Arab Gulf State, but the new Emir has see it as the 
dominant power in the GCC that should be challenged. As a result, the new Qatari Emir 
and his government tended to seek out foreign policies that rivaled those of Saudi Arabia. 
Qatar also hosted the new media station, Al-Jazeera TV, which has become a thorn in the 
side of Saudi Arabia. This tension has been mitigated by the diplomatic efforts of many 
states.      
The final factor that has had a substantial effect on the decision-making 
procedures of the GCC states, especially Kuwait, was that Saddam Hussein remained in 
power following his military defeat at the hands of the International Coalition in 1990. 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were the two states most concerned by the continuing threat 
posed by Saddam continuing to hold power. The impact of the Invasion of Kuwait had 
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increased sensitivities surrounding immediate security concerns at the end of that war. 
This security concern had a large impact on the decisions that were made at that time to 
comply with the fast and sensible security guarantee that was needed and offered by the 
bilateral agreement with the external powers.  
The GCC’s failure to attain a reasonable and suitable solution based on the 
recommendations of the Oman proposal, the failure of the Declaration of Damascus, the 
disagreement over future relations with Israel and Iran, and the development of disputes 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar all contributed to increased levels of tension among the 
alliance’s members. Finally, the fear of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein contributed to the 
member-states’ realization that the GCC would be unable to reach to any collective 
security mechanism in the foreseeable future. As a result of these reasons, the GCC 
remains weak, as the components of the regime have become less coherent with each 
other. In the case of the GCC, decision-making procedures have been negatively 
impacted by the actions of its members and maintaining the weakness. As neorealist 
theory predicted, if the alliance does not meet the security requirements of its members, it 
will force those members to seek different means of meeting their requirements. As a 
result, a series of bilateral agreements were made between individual GCC member-states 
and the Western powers of the United States and the European Union. The next 
significant time period that this thesis analyses is the period following the United States’ 
2003 invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. 
C. FROM THE UNITED STATES’ 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ AND 
ONWARD (2003–PRESENT) 
The Invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a turning point, not only in the Gulf Region but 
also in the Middle East as a whole. It has shifted the balance of power between Iraq and 
Iran to the benefit of the latter. The first impact of the war took place even before its 
beginning; this was the disagreement between the U.S. and the GCC States, long-term 
allies, over the waging of the war. The United States, pushed by conservative figures in 
the George W. Bush administration in 2003, had developed a strategy based on a 
preemptive doctrine, which believed in bringing about regime changing through forceful 
intervention regardless of United Nations Security Council support, which what 
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happened with Iraq. The U.S. invasion and subsequent defeat of the Iraqi government, as 
well as the resulting Iraqi military destruction and occupation, has shifted the balancing 
of power that had shaped the Gulf Region for decades. As a result, Iran emerged as the 
dominant power in the region with nuclear ambitions and supported by a new allied 
government in Iraq that shares with them similar Shi’ism beliefs. Furthermore, the Arab 
revolution that has spread in the Gulf and the wider Arab world beginning in the spring of 
2011, and the probability of Iran exploiting it in order to destabilize the GCC 
governments has emerged as new challenge to the GCC States. The United State’s 
abandonment of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak alarmed the GCC regarding the 
United States’ credibility as an ally against any threat to the GCC member-states’ 
regimes. These radical shifts in the balance of power in the Gulf, as well as the new 
challenges posed by uprisings in the Arab world, have caused the GCC to reflect on its 
failures again. This in turn has led to a reinvigorated desire to achieve collective security. 
However, the GCC member-states’ attempt to develop a mechanism of collective security 
after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 until just before the eruption of the Arab uprising has 
been moving slowly, making little real progress. New calls for expanding the GCC have 
raised more questions than answers about its decision-making procedures, which are 
supposed to be compatible with other regime components, so as to strengthen the GCC to 
the extent that it can rely on itself more than on external powers for its own security. 
Once again, the GCC’s deep weakness as a regime constrains its efforts to speed up 
towards a real collective security mechanism that would make the option of external 
security protection less realistic for its members. 
The first factor that emerged during this period of time was the disagreement 
between the United States and the GCC over the United States’ intention to invade Iraq in 
2003. The GCC clearly tried to convince the United States not to proceed in invading Iraq 
because Arab public opinion would not support such a movement against Saddam.  
Thomas Mattair notes, “They asserted that the U.S. would not be able to control the 
aftermath of such a war.”84 Saudi Arabia objected to the war and refused to cooperate 
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explicitly with the United States unless the U.N. Security Council legitimatized the 
invasion. However, Saudi Arabia’s position against the war did not reflect the decision of 
the GCC as a regime. Kuwait supported the United States in the war in the hope that it 
would remove the security threat presented by Saddam, who had invaded their country in 
1990. The Kuwaitis also viewed it as an act of revenge against Saddam’s regime. Qatar 
showed maximum support in terms of logistic matters by hosting the largest U.S. military 
base in the region. Bahrain already hosts the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and 
facilitated political and logistical support for the invasion. Eventually, some of the GCC 
states came to support the U.S. invasion explicitly and others implicitly, not because they 
agreed on the invasion, but as a sign of gratitude shown to the United States to its 
assistance in the Second Gulf War in 1991. Some GCC countries proved this gratitude by 
opening their military bases to the coalition’s military forces against Iraq, while Saudi 
Arabia avoided any participation in any war that could cause tension with hardliner 
clergy. However, the consequences that had been predicted by the GCC states came 
about – Iran emerged as a regional power, and sectarian tensions spread throughout the 
region. The differing positions held by individual member-states before the war showed 
how each GCC member-state has its individual foreign policy that is different from that 
of the others, and how the GCC has been very weak throughout its history as a regime. 
The most important lesson learned from this situation is that for the GCC member-states 
to rely on the United States to meet their security concerns is folly and that they have to 
strengthen their own capabilities and come to rely on themselves.  
The second factor was the emergence of Iran’s desire to dominate the Gulf as a 
regional power. This is by far the most important consequence of the United States’ 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Although the GCC States had seen Iraq under Saddam Hussein as a 
grave threat to them, based on their memory of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, they were 
also concerned about the consequences that the collapse of Saddam’s government could 
have on their regional security. The GCC’s main concern arising from the United States’ 
invasion of Iraq is clearly the change in the regional balance of power. It has been known 
that the Gulf States’ foreign policy is to ensure a balance between Iraq and Iran that 
prevents either of them from dominating the Gulf region.  
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The new government in Iraq has strong ties with Iran, which has increased the 
security concerns of the GCC States. It is the first time for the GCC that the Iranian threat 
has shifted from threatening the GCC States by air, by sea, or through proxies, to be 
threatening them directly on the ground via the Iraqi borders, due to Iran’s domination of 
the government in Iraq. Moreover, Iran’s increasing nuclear ambitions and the radical 
foreign policy espoused by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who won the elections of 
2005 and 2009, has pushed the GCC States to speed up their efforts to put their disputes 
aside and work together on the right path of achieving collective security.  
Among the GCC member-states, after the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq 
there has been a realization of the importance of moving ahead in reinvigorating the 
regime to meet these challenges. Saudi foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal said to an 
audience in Bahrain in December, 2004 “that a new regional security framework needed 
to be constructed around the following four pillars: a strong, vibrant GCC in which 
members are integrated economically, politically, militarily; the inclusion of Yemen; a 
stable and unified Iraq; and the inclusion of Iran.”85  He noted also “ that the security of 
the region should not depend on the United States, but should stem from guarantees from 
a declaration by the Security Council” However, no real progress has been made 
regarding collective security other than Saudi proposals in 2008 to increase the 
manpower of the Peninsula Shield to 30,000 solders. This proposal called for expanding 
the Peninsula Shield and stationing the troops in each of the six member countries, but 
discussion about it continues, without outcome. Once again, progress has been too slow 
and the GCC remains too weak to provide physical security protection to its members. 
The third factor that alarmed the GCC states enough to inspire them to put aside 
their disagreements and to rethink their reliance on the United States for their survival 
was the United States’ abandonment of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, who was a 
key ally of United States for more that thirty years. The eruption of uprisings throughout 
the Arab world surprised the entire international community. In less than twenty days, the 
Tunisian rebellions overthrew the strongest dictator government in North Africa. This 
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incident inspired all the Arabs living under dictatorial governments to revolt against their 
regimes. The Egyptian revolts built upon the experiences in Tunisia, and the Egyptian 
people started their own revolution in January 2011. The Egyptian revolution compelled 
the United States to abandon President Mubarak and to insist that he must step down, 
which he eventually did. The United States’ choice to stand with the people of Egypt 
angered Saudi Arabia and other GCC leaders, and their faith in the United States’ 
reliability in meeting their security needs was shaken to the core. As a result, the GCC 
member-states decided to take a more active step toward their providing for their own 
security, using the Peninsula Shield force to intervene in Bahrain in order to prevent Iran 
from exploiting the new situation in the Arab world against their regimes. The GCC was 
the most active regime during the uprisings in the Arab world; they facilitated the 
intervention of the international community in Libya by asking the U.N. Security Council 
to order a no-fly zone over Libya that later developed into intervention against Al 
Qaddafi’s regime. 
The GCC member-states have also started initiatives to reduce the tension 
between the Yemeni government and its citizens. However, new calls for expanding the 
GCC to include Jordan and Morocco have not made clear what the goal of this expansion 
is and why these two states were specifically asked to join. However, the GCC remains 
weak and cannot guarantee its collective security. Thus, the incoherency of the 
component of the regime causes the GCC to remain weak, as predicted by regime theory. 
Neorealist theory remains the best means of explaining the GCC’s behavior. The new 
social movement throughout the Arab world should encourage the GCC leaders to 
strengthen the GCC in order to be able to meet the expectations of its people toward 
collective security.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s performance during the last thirty-plus years 
clearly shows that this alliance remains unqualified to achieve the goal for which it was 
created – that of collective security. Many experts attribute this inability to internal and 
external strains which have limited the GCC’s member-states from reaching a consensus 
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upon the mechanism or mechanisms required to decrease their dependence on external 
powers for protection in order to achieve security rather than achieving this desired 
security through the GCC. 
This chapter has examined the evolution of the GCC since its inception through 
the lenses of neorealist theory and regime theory. Neorealist theory predicts that states 
join an alliance when they perceive a common threat and that this alliance will end after 
the threat disappears. It also predicts that the members of an alliance will seek other 
options if the alliance does not achieve their expectations of security. Regime theory 
states that if the components of any regime, which include principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making process, become less coherent, the regime would be a weak one. In the 
case of the GCC, this chapter argues that neorealist theory explains the behavior of the 
GCC. When its member-states realized that the GCC could not provide them with the 
collective security that they need, they sought other options. The results were the bilateral 
agreements that they signed with the United States and European powers to provide them 
with security. However, neorealist theory does not explain the reasons caused the GCC 
States to seek security guarantee outside their regime. Rather, regime theory explains 
these reasons. The inconsistencies between the decision-making procedures and rules on 
one hand and the principles and norms on the other hand have caused the GCC to be a 
weak regime. This inherent weakness, which has been present in the GCC from its 
inception until today, has made other security options more attractive to GCC members 
than waiting the GCC to become strong enough to guarantee collective security to its 
members. The three periods of time, from the GCC’s inception until invasion of Kuwait, 
from liberation of Kuwait until the 1990 invasion of Iraq, and from the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq until the present, all serve to demonstrate the weaknesses that have led the GCC 
member-states to seek other security options, just as neorealism and regime theory 
explain. Finally, the dangerous climate arising from the Iraq war in 2003 and the latest 





behavior and should also serve remind them of their main intention at the time of the 
GCC’s inception. Perhaps this time, the leaders of the six GCC member-states will 
succeed in overcoming their existing conflicting preferences, and will reach a consensus 
on the best way to achieve collective security. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The GCC was created in the shadow of various challenges to the Gulf States that 
threatened their survival. Common historical features played a significant role in 
facilitating the establishment the GCC. All the GCC States share similar values, culture, 
religion, and political systems; all of them are oil-exporting nations, as well. Facing the 
extreme security threats of the Iranian revolution in 1979, its new foreign policy that has 
been based on exporting the Islamic revolution to Arab Gulf States, Iran’s sponsorship of 
violent anti-monarchy groups, and the potential consequences of the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Gulf States came together in creating the Gulf Cooperation Council as the first 
cooperative regime in the Gulf. Although this regime’s charter did not explicitly state 
which security concerns were behind its creation, security was the main incentive and the 
end goal of the GCC’s establishment. The GCC’s weak performance over the last thirty 
years has showed that this regime is too weak to offer the collective security that its 
members expected. This failure to achieve collective security has stimulated many 
researchers to explore the reasons behind it, and the literature on the GCC points out that 
the alliance’s efforts to reach a consensus upon the mechanisms required to lessening the 
reliance on external powers for security protection have been limited by many factors, 
such as border disputes between member states, mistrust and suspicion, fear of Saudi 
hegemony, and the smaller member-states’ fear of losing their sovereignty to Saudi 
Arabia or to the military force that would defend them. Although it is true that all of these 
reasons have kept the GCC from performing as expected, very little academic framework 
has been created to examine these reasons through the lens of international relations 
theory. 
By applying neorealist theory and regime theory to the GCC case, it is possible to 
assess the behavior of its states and to use these two theories as a means of understanding 
the problem that prevents the GCC from achieving its security goals. This thesis has 
examined the GCC’s performance through the lenses of neorealist theory and regime 
theory; to understand the relations between these two theories and the goal of collective 
security of the GCC, it has looked at the relations between neorealist theory with both 
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cooperation and collective security. Neorealism expects that states will form alliances to 
cooperate only when they face a common rising threat that cannot be deterred separately. 
As the Arab Gulf States faced a common threat of Iraq and Iran, they succeeded in 
creating an alliance in the form of the GCC. Collective security is defined as a system or 
form of cooperation that guarantees peace, in which the members of the regime agree that 
an attack against one of them will be treated as an attack against all of them and will 
result in a collective military response. Thus, the aim of the GCC regime to cooperate is 
in line with neorealism’s prediction of a specific situation where states form alliances in 
order to cooperate. However, neorealism does not expect the regime to succeed if there 
are other options that can provide security to its members.  
To explain why the states within the GCC regime chose to seek other mechanisms 
for protection, it is important to understand what is a regime. Regime theory defines a 
regime as a “set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors and expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.”86 Additionally, “Weakening of the regime involves incoherence 
among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related 
behavior.”87  
Before explaining this thesis’s hypothesis, two case studies were provided as 
examples of how the GCC failed to perform as expected, and how the GCC reacted in 
each case. The first case was Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The GCC’s inability to 
provide an appropriate and adequate response to the invasion of one of its members 
demonstrated the GCC’s failures to achieve its aspired-to collective security. Moreover, 
the GCC member-states showed its weakness even before the invasion, when they did not 
support Kuwait in its negotiation with Iraq prior to the invasion. Additionally, many 
argue that Saudi Arabia, the largest member-state within the GCC, did not respond 
effectively until their leaders were shown satellite photos of Iraqi forces massing on the 
Saudi borders by the then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney six days after the 
invasion. Moreover, even after the invasion, the GCC failed to achieve a viable and 
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adequate solution based on Oman’s recommendation to increase the size of the Peninsula 
Shield to 100,000 soldiers, and the failure of the Damascus Declaration, which called for 
a security structure that ensured Pan-Arab expansion. 
The second case is the threat posed by Iran, which started after the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 and remains until today. The Iranian threat to the GCC States has 
increased and Iran’s capability from military missiles and navy vessels has improved, 
while the GCC’s symbolic force capability, the Peninsula Shield, has been limited. Iran’s 
ambition to dominate not only the Gulf, but also the region has increased after the 
collapse of Saddam’s regime in Iraq following the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
The Iranian threat to the GCC states has become even more serious than before with 
respect to the Shi’ite government that came to power in Iraq after the invasion, and its 
foreign policy since the elections of 2005 has shifted to be more aggressive toward the 
West and the GCC States. Moreover, Iran under President Ahmadinejad has both sped 
the build-up of its defense capabilities and intervened in the GCC’s regional and 
domestic affairs. Additionally, Iran’s ambition to acquire nuclear weapons under the 
cover of its civilian nuclear program has increased the concerns regarding Gulf security 
not only among the GCC’s member-states, but also in the international community. 
Although the GCC States are fully aware of all of these grave dangers to their survival, 
they have not reached a common understanding within the GCC that would allow them to 
overcome their disputes and face Iran collectively. Instead, they have relied on the 
external power of the United States and the European Union.  
It is true that neorealist theory explains the behavior of the GCC States when they 
chose to seek other security options outside the collectivity of the GCC by signing 
bilateral security agreements the United States and the European Union. However, 
neorealism also predicted that this alliance would end when it could not meet its expected 
goals, so the GCC is doomed to come to an end. The fact that, thirty years after its 
inception, the GCC still exists, and that cooperation among its member-states is 
developing, though slowly, cannot be explained by neorealist theory alone. To understand 
why the GCC still exists and why its members have been forced to seek other alliances to 
provide them with security than the GCC, this thesis looked to regime theory to explain 
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the phenomenon. As mentioned before, regime theory expects regimes to be weakened 
when the four components of a regime, that is, principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedure, become less coherent or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent 
with principles, norm, rules, and procedures. Therefore, this thesis hypothesizes that the 
GCC’s failure to guarantee collective security to its members goes beyond 
incompatibility to domestic politics and security decision-making thought-processes 
within each of the states that as a result have weakened the GCC as a regime. Further, 
this weakness has resulted in the GCC member-states’ seeking other security options by 
relying on external power through bilateral security agreements, as predicted by 
neorealism. 
This thesis analyzed and examined three critical time periods during the past 
thirty-plus years and demonstrated how the causes and results present in and perpetuated 
by the GCC alliance were weak and ineffective, due to troubles in its commitments to the 
rules, and the actual practices in the regime’s decision-making procedures that have 
become increasingly inconsistent with the other components of the regime.  
First, this thesis examined the period from the GCC’s creation in 1981 until the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq under Saddam Hussein in 1990; the invasion represented the 
most difficult time since the GCC’s inception. The GCC’s inability to effectively provide 
collective security in support of its member-state Kuwait exposed the GCC’s weakness. 
Numerous factors, such as border disputes, fears of Saudi hegemony, anxiety and fear of 
the use of a powerful military force against the ruling elites, and the problem of command 
and control over the Peninsula Shield force have had a negative impact on the alliance’s 
rules and decision-making processes. This weakened the GCC, as predicted by regime 
theory, and forced its members to seek new form of alliance to meet their security 
concerns, as neorealist theory predicted. 
Secondly, this thesis examined the period from the liberation of Kuwait by 
Coalition Forces in 1990 until the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq. During this 
period, several significant incidents occurred that had a notable effect on maintaining the 
GCC’s weak nature. It is essential to note that the GCC’s inability to provide an 
appropriate and acceptable response to the invasion of one of its members caused the 
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GCC to reflect on its failures, which in turn led to a reinvigorated desire to achieve 
collective security. Nevertheless, the GCC failed to achieve a feasible and acceptable 
solution based on the suggestions of the Oman proposal and the failure of the 
“Declaration of Damascus.” Moreover, growing disputes between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar contributed to increased levels of tension among alliance members, and the fact 
that Saddam Hussein was still in power after the Second Gulf War in 1990, were all 
strong reasons for security concerns. As a consequence of these situations, the GCC 
remained weak and its member-states had to seek alternative means to achieve security. 
Several Gulf States signed bilateral agreements with the United States and the European 
Union. Once again, neorealist theory expected this. This also supports regime theory’s 
argument that if the components of the regime become less coherent or if actual practices 
are increasingly inconsistent with each other the regime will remain weak, and as the 
GCC member-states have not complied with the rules and decision-making procedures of 
the regime, they have negatively impacted the actions of its members causing 
incoherence with other principle and norms of the GCC and leading to its weakness. 
Finally, this thesis analyzed the period from the United States’ 2003 invasion of 
Iraq until the new uprisings throughout the Arab world starting in 2011. The Invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 shifted the balance of power in the Gulf, leaving the GCC to anxiously 
watch the rise of Iranian power after the invasion of Iraq. The collapse of Saddam’s 
regime in Iraq and the subsequent transfer of power to the Iraqi Shi’ites have shifted the 
Iranian threat from “over the horizon” to “on the ground.” The new Shi’ite-led 
government in Iraq has become allied to Iranian government because they share Shi’ism. 
As a result Iran, has emerged as regional power that has greater influence around the 
Arab world and is backed by its nuclear ambitions. This increased threat by Iran 
following the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq has developed by the new revolution 
movements around the Arab world. The GCC has accused Iran of using these 
revolutionary movements to encourage the Shi’ite communities inside the GCC member-
states to destabilize Gulf security. The United States’ credibility among the Gulf regimes 
has decreased since the abandonment of Egyptian President Mubarak in February 2011. 
However, not much effort has been made to overcome the disputes among the GCC 
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States in order to reach the collective security of the GCC States and to decrease their 
reliance on external power. The GCC’s new appeal to Jordan and Morocco to join the 
GCC has raised more questions than answers about the future of the GCC. Once again, 
the GCC’s deep weakness as a regime restrains its efforts to reach a real mechanism that 
could achieve collective security, and as a result keeps external security options less 
realistic for its members. All of the situations that have been examined in this thesis have 
proved the thesis’s argument that the GCC’s weakness, as explained by regime theory, 
forced the GCC member-states to seek alternative form of alliance in order to guarantee 
their security, inclining their decision–making procedures toward signing bilateral 
agreement with the United States and European powers. 
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